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ABSTRACT 
Excelling at formulating, analyzing and implementing effective energy policies requires a 
holistic understanding of its economic, socio-political and engineering aspects.  However, 
both in academia and in practice, one (or more) of these perspectives is often neglected or 
understudied.   
Considering this, this dissertation studies three examples of energy policies focusing on a 
lesser known, and often-neglected aspect.  The examples are compiled as three 
independent, self-contained essays.  The first essay analyses the power engineering 
aspect of a carbon tax. Using U.S. market practices and policies as an example, a carbon 
tax is operationalized in a wholesale electricity market. Its effect is examined on the 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Reliability Test System 28-bus 
model examining both transmission congestion and other energy policies. The results 
show how a carbon tax affects emission savings, and revenue streams for generators, 
loads and the government. They indicate that such interactions could lead to ineffective 
emissions reduction.   
The second essay analyzes the socio-political aspect of Combined Heat and Power 
(CHP). By using expert elicitation and document analysis, the non-financial barriers for 
CHP are analyzed. The results show three significant barriers a) the business model of the 
electrical utility b) negative subjective impressions and c) challenges in allocating the 
risks and benefits.   
  iv 
The third essay analyzes the economic/market aspect of Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G). Model of 
a centralized V2G system is developed and applied to the 2015 wholesale electricity 
market in Texas (Houston Hub). Three scenarios are examined. In the first scenario, 
electric vehicles are paid based on a fixed retail market price; in the second, they are paid 
a time-varying retail market price; in the third, the virtual power plant shares 50% of its 
total reward with the participating vehicles. The results demonstrate that, while this 
system is always financially profitable to the virtual power plant and the system operator 
gets grid services, the electric vehicles could lose money. Further, results show that these 
vehicles with lower per unit output-battery cost could lose more money because of 
extensive battery over-use and insufficient reward at current market prices.   
The results have several important policy implications. Study of a power-engineering 
aspect of a carbon tax reveals that due to operational interactions, in the short term, a 
carbon tax might not reduce emissions. Study of the socio-political issue of CHP reveals 
that economically viable technologies may sometimes not gain traction in the market 
because of internal business models and negative subjective impressions. Similarly, the 
study of the economic/market aspect of a V2G reveals that lower battery costs, subsidies 
for participation, and more rewarding market products could all make V2G more 
economically viable to the vehicle owners. More importantly, these results also imply 
thorough analysis would reveal the intricacies and allow the policymaker to understand 
the impacts of such a policy holistically. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In today’s world, energy policies play a vital role in shaping sustainable economic 
development. Excelling at formulating, analyzing and implementing effective energy 
policies is an essential aspiration for many countries. Such excellence is only possible 
through reconciliation of trade-offs between different (and sometimes divergent) agendas.  
For such an agreement, the policy process (see Figure 1-1 for a simplified view) needs to 
be thoroughly understood using holistic insights from engineering, socio-political, 
economic/ market perspectives. However, both in academia and in practice, one or more 
of these aspects are often neglected. This dissertation uses engineering tools with insights 
from social science to study three examples of energy policies focusing on the 
understudied and often overlooked issues.  The next section describes a few other 
prominent theories and frameworks that explain the policy process. Readers familiar with 
this topic can skip directly to section 1.2. 
 
 
Strategy and 
policy 
development
Policy 
enactment
Post 
implementation 
evaluation
Policy 
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Problem 
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Figure 1-1: The policy stages framework 
 
1.1 Theories on the policy analysis 
Figure 1-1 shows a simplified view of an extremely complicated process. It is also 
referred to as the “Policy Stages” framework. According to this framework, the policy 
process begins with problem identification such as such as how increasing Carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emissions from fossil-fired power plants is deteriorating human life in 
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New York. The policy analysis (note that these stages can be name differently in different 
subfields. Example of Stanford et. al [1]  is described in footnote 1) stage follows this 
stage. The policy analysis stage focuses on evaluating policy options in the political 
context. For example, to lower CO2 emissions, a Carbon tax or Cap and Trade are two 
viable options. What are their costs? What are their benefits?  This stage is then followed 
by policy development, e.g., a carbon tax is chosen over cap and trade. Then its 
consequences are thoroughly studied, and an enactment plan is developed. After the 
policy is established, it is enacted. For example, the carbon tax becomes a law and is 
brought into practice. After enactment, the policy needs to be monitored, analyzed, 
criticized and assessed during the post-implementation evaluation stage.  
The policy process occurs over several decades, involves hundreds of actors who are 
ready to give their own “spin” and includes interactions with other existing policies and 
sub-fields.   Therefore, the stages, as described in the Policy Stages framework, might not 
always follow a linear, top-down progression. They are just “moments” in the 
policymaking process, and they can occur linearly (as described above), simultaneously 
or even in inverse order.  Further, they can also be influenced by another policy process.  
For example, in the CO2 case above, vehicular emission policy in New York or a federal 
emissions policy might affect the carbon tax policy of New York. Therefore, Policy 
                                                 
1 The naming convention of these stages could be different in different policy subfields. E.g., in 
Implementation literature, the first two stages are generally named as Understanding the policy problem stage and 
understanding the existing system stage (Stephanie Moulton, Jodi R Sandfort, The Strategic Action Field 
Framework for Policy Implementation Research. Policy Studies Journal Vol, 2016.) The interview guide 
for the second essay (see chapter 3) is based on the implementation literature. 
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Stages framework falls flat while trying to describe this process sequentially.  Hence, 
several newer theories and frameworks have emerged. Some of these are described 
below.   
Institutional Rational Choice: This framework is the most widely used and thoroughly 
studied. It is represented in the figure below. In this framework, the “action-arena” is a 
social space where individuals (or corporate actors) interact, exchange goods and 
services, and solve problems. This arena is responsible for the policy outcomes like a 
carbon tax policy. These outcomes can be evaluated, and they inform the a) rules used by 
participants to order their relationships b) states of the community and world where they 
live. For example, for a carbon tax policy, this framework could help understand the logic 
behind selecting this policy. For instance Qi [2] uses this model to illustrate that the 
carbon tax policy in China is the product of interactions between several decision makers 
who are governed by their own community rules and values, and also by country’s 
economy and international influence. 
Patterns of Interactions Outcomes
Action Arena
Actors Action situations
Evaluation 
Criteria
Physical/
Material 
Conditions
Attributes of 
Community
Rules-in-use
 
Figure 1-2: Framework for institutional rational choice analysis 
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The Multiple-Steams Approach: This approach helps in the understanding of the policy 
process under the conditions of ambiguity in temporal order. "Ambiguity," for this 
framework, is defined as many ways (that are often not-reconcilable) of thinking about 
the same problem, and “temporal order” describes the nature of the policy process where 
adoption of goals, ideas, and alternatives depend on when the policies are being made. 
For example, Heinmiller et. al [3] has used this framework to identify why some 
governments are early adopters of carbon policy, while others are not. They find that the 
most critical factor in rapid adoption of such a plan was the presence of a committed 
champion at the center of the government during that time. 
 
Punctuated-Equilibrium Theory: This theory suggests that the logic of stability and 
incrementalism drives the policy process; however, occasionally there are significant 
departures from the past. On the contrary to most of the other theories, it helps to explain 
both stability and change. For example, using this theory, Speth [4] discusses the details 
about the dynamics of US environmental policy changes and factors that lead to this 
change. 
 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework: In this framework, the filtered sets of two 
exogenous sets of variables affect the policy subsystem (see figure below). The first set is 
relatively stable like basic constitutional structure, sociocultural values, and natural 
resources related to the system. The second set is relatively dynamic like significant 
socioeconomic changes like social movements, or influence from policy decisions from 
other subsystems.  The policy subsystem consists of actors who often group to form 
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“advocacy coalitions.” They have a set of core beliefs, and then they use different 
methods to influence policy change that suits their beliefs. Like other theories and 
frameworks above, this can also be used to answer climate-related questions. For 
example, Villagra [5] uses this framework to describe why Canada was falling behind in 
the climate race in the 2000s.   
Policy subsystem
Coalition ACoalition Policy BrokersPolicy rokers Coalition BCoalition 
A. Policy beliefs
B. Resources
. Policy beliefs
. esources
Strategy and 
guidance 
instruments
Strategy and 
guidance 
instru ents
A. Policy beliefs
B. Resources
. Policy beliefs
. esources
Strategy and 
guidance 
instruments
Strategy and 
guidance 
instru ents
Decision by 
sovereigns
ecision by 
sovereigns
Institutional rules, resource allocations, and appointmentsInstitutional rules, resource allocations, and appoint ents
Policy outputsPolicy outputs
Policy impactsPolicy i pacts
Constraints and 
resources of 
subsystem actors
Stable parameters
Constitutional structure
Sociocultural values
Natural resources
Constitutional structure
Sociocultural values
atural resources
Dynamic parameters
Social movements
Policy impacts from other 
subsystem
Social ove ents
Policy i pacts fro  other 
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Figure 1-3: Advocacy coalition framework 
  
Like the ones described above, several other models, approaches, frameworks, and 
theories have emerged in the past decades. Several of them are elaborated in detail in 
Sabatier et. al and Kingdon et. al  [6; 7]. These theories and frameworks could provide 
different perspectives on the same policy process; that would make the analysis more 
holistic and the policy outcome more effective. 
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The choice of the model should depend on framing of the research questions that is in 
turn guided by the question what is at stake?  The essays in this dissertation discuss 
energy policy issues related to the U.S. electricity industry. First, the electricity industry 
is one of the most significant contributors of Green House Gases (GHG). GHGs can be 
linked to environment, health, and economy. This brings citizen’s right to live in a 
healthy environment and the structure of the current economy at risk. In a longer term, it 
also brings the lives of our future generation at risk. Second, innovative technologies like 
Combined Heat and Power (CHP) or concepts like Vehicle to Grid (V2G), despite having 
broader benefits, are facing deployment barriers. This is because of limitedness in state 
policies, the complex interplay between different stakeholders and negative subjective 
connotations. Such an inability to deploy the right technology brings our democratic 
values, deliberation process and stakeholder process into stake.  The U.S. electricity 
industry has close interrelationship between socio-political structure (including human 
values), economic/market structure, and technical structure. Thus, it puts all of these at 
stake and therefore the lives of our future generation at risk.  
Let’s see some examples. To understand the deployment barriers faced by CHP, rational 
institutional choice framework or its derivative would be the best fit.  Similarly, to 
understand why some countries make and enact better carbon reduction policies than 
others, an approach on the multiple-steams would be the best fit.  Therefore, the 
researcher or the practitioner should not be biased towards one framework or the other. 
Instead, they should embrace the frames that would best fit their situation.  
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Since my focus in more on highlighting the importance of missing pillars in the holistic-
triad (see section 1.2), I will not dive deep into any of these frameworks. I will, however, 
use several them and their derivatives to inform both my methods and conclusions; will 
and mention them if (and when) they are needed.  
1.2 Holistic insights 
Holistic insight into the policy process requires a thorough understanding of its socio-
political, engineering, and economic/market aspects. Understanding this triad is a 
necessary condition to prevent enacting ineffective energy policies. Additionally, on a 
case by case basis, other elements like the environmental or the legal aspects could also 
be analyzed. But the triad of socio-political, engineering and economic/market should not 
be neglected.    
The socio-political aspects play a significant role in influencing the rules, laws, norms 
and the state of the community (see 1.1 Institutional Rational Choice) that influences (and 
is influenced by) the policy process. Power and the relationship dynamics at the global, 
national, subnational and organizational level have a substantial influence on the energy 
policy. Therefore, a thorough understanding of this aspect is essential for enacting an 
effective energy policy. Take the example of CHP.  CHP is efficient, cash positive and 
supports future energy transition. Therefore, it is widely adopted in Europe (see essay 2).  
So, why has not it gained enough traction in the U.S.?  Socio-political analysis 
(understanding of the social construct and power play) would help in understanding this 
issue.  In general, under analysis of (or sometimes even missing to analyze) the socio-
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political aspects will inaccurately portray the impact of power and relationship dynamics 
that could ultimately also lead to policy failure.  
Like the socio-political aspect, the economic/market element is another important factor. 
It encompasses the study of the ways societies and individuals organize activities such as 
production and distribution of goods and services that are related to the energy system. 
Economic/market aspect would reveal insights on the profitability, utility, and scarcity of 
the resources in question. For example, Vehicle to Grid (V2G) is a technically viable 
concept (see essay 3). However, in the past two decades, it has not gained any 
commercial traction. So, is V2G profitable for all the participating actors? Do the present 
market rules support this? These are some questions that could not be answered without a 
thorough understanding of the economic/market aspect. In general, underanalysis of (or 
sometimes even missing to analyze) the economic/market aspects will inaccurately 
estimate the profitability, utility, and scarcity of the goods and services that are produced 
and distributed. Such an inaccurate estimation would lead to ineffective energy policy 
that could ultimately be set to failure. 
Similarly, the engineering aspect (could also be referred to as the technical aspect) is also 
equally important. Technical elements relate to the technicalities and operational issues of 
an energy policy. Policies that involve generation, transmission, the distribution of energy 
would interact with the power system operation. For example, transmission congestion 
can influence the effectiveness of a carbon tax when the flow of electricity on a 
transmission line is restricted below its optimal level by either physical conditions or 
operational restrictions (essay 1). For example, if a transmission line rated at 60 MW is 
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carrying 60 MW, it is 100% congested and cannot carry any additional power. 
Operationally, such transmission congestion could alter generator dispatch/load demand 
or change equilibrium prices in a power system with a carbon tax, potentially by altering 
its effectiveness. Depending on the location of congestion, it could inadvertently force the 
market to dispatch more power from a coal generator and shutdown lower carbon 
generators, undermining emission reductions. Such insights would not be revealed 
without a thorough analysis of the engineering aspect of a carbon tax. In general, under 
analysis of (or sometimes even missing to analyze) the engineering aspects will 
inaccurately estimate the operational interaction.  
However, for several energy policies, analysis of some of these aspects are often 
neglected. Such negligence makes the policy ambiguous and less effective. It could even 
lead to policy failure.  Take the example of a Distributed Energy Management System 
(DEMS). It is a technically sound concept that facilitates incorporation of renewables at 
the distribution system by utilizing the “smartness” of the smart meters. However, it has 
not moved beyond a few pilot projects. The study of politics, governance and relationship 
dynamics of DEMS are often neglected. This study would reveal (future research) the 
actors are not actively pursuing this concept. 
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Figure 1-4: Examples of energy policies that will be studied in this dissertation 
A thorough understanding will help in discovering a phenomenon that sometimes 
counteracts and at other times, enhances the effectiveness of any energy policy. For, 
example, an economist generally studies tax-related issue. Therefore, the economic 
aspects of a carbon tax are thoroughly investigated. As mentioned before, interaction with 
power systems operation is often neglected. And, power system operations could 
significantly change the effectiveness of a carbon tax.  Therefore, missing to analyze this 
aspect will make the policy less effective.  However, if such elements are timely and 
thoroughly studied, the plan can carefully be crafted to alleviate the negative operational 
interactions and to boost the positive functional interactions.  
Unfortunately, both in academia and in practice, one (or more) of these aspects is often 
neglected. Considering this, this dissertation studies three examples of energy policies 
focusing on a lesser known, and often-neglected aspect  (see Figure 1-4).  
Using U.S. market practices and policies as an example, the first essay analyses the 
power engineering aspect of a carbon tax. A carbon tax is operationalized in a wholesale 
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electricity market. A one-stage forward market is simulated, and its effect is examined on 
the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Reliability Test System 28-
bus model examining both transmission congestion and other energy policies. Results 
show how the carbon tax affects emission savings, and revenue streams for generators, 
loads, transmission right holders and government. They indicate that such interactions 
could lead to ineffective emissions reduction.   
The second essay analyzes the socio-political aspect of highly efficient engineering 
technology – Combined Heat and Power (CHP). It examines the non-financial barriers 
that are faced by CHP projects in the United States. It uses expert (developers, owners 
and operators, regulators, and other stakeholders) elicitation and document analysis to 
infer the results. The results show three significant barriers a) the business model of the 
electrical utility b) negative subjective impressions and c) challenges in allocating the 
risks and benefits.   
The third essay analyzes the economic/market aspect of Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G). The 
model of a centralized V2G system is developed and applied to the 2015 wholesale 
electricity market in Texas (Houston Hub). Using Dynamic Programming/Unit-
Commitment program, three scenarios are examined. In the first scenario, electric 
vehicles owners are paid based on a fixed retail market price; in the second, they are paid 
a time-varying retail market price; in the third, the virtual power plant shares 50% of its 
total reward with the participating vehicle owners. The results demonstrate that, while 
this system is always financially profitable to the virtual power plant and the system 
operator gets grid services, the electric vehicles could lose money. Further, results show 
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that these vehicles with lower per unit output-battery cost could lose more money 
because of extensive battery over-use and insufficient reward at current market prices.   
The results have several important policy implications. Study of the power-engineering 
aspect (understanding how a carbon tax interacts with the power system operations using 
an optimal power flow) of a carbon tax reveals that due to operational interactions, in the 
short term, a carbon tax might not reduce emissions. These interactions emerge when the 
physical and material conditions of the U.S. electricity system interact with the existing 
rules of the market (see section 1.1 on Institutional Rational Choice Framework) or with 
the existing renewable promotion policies (see section 1.1 on Advocacy Coalition 
Framework). Therefore, underanalysis of the engineering aspect would not reveal the 
impacts of such interactions. Thus, it could make the policy analysis incomplete.  
In the United States, due to the current political quagmire, a federal carbon tax is not an 
immediately plausible option. However, states like Washington, New York, Oregon, 
Massachusetts, and Rhode Island are independently pursuing it. At all these places, the 
carbon tax policy is at the policy analysis stage (see section 1.1 for Policy Stages 
framework). Therefore, the methods and the insights presented in this dissertation would 
be helpful in analyzing, developing the carbon tax policy and enacting it effectively.  
The study of the socio-political aspect (understanding the power play and role of opinion 
leadership using expert elicitation based on the Strategic Action Framework) of CHP 
reveals that economically viable matured technologies may sometimes not gain traction 
in the market mostly because of the business model of the utility, negative subjective 
impressions and complications in allocating risks and benefit.  
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The CHP policy context in the U.S. has gone through massive shifts: before the late 
1970s, there were no U.S. federal or state policies encouraging CHP deployment but the 
1978 Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), incentivized CHP by forcing 
utilities to buy electricity from cost-competitive independent generators. Many CHP 
power plants—especially in the industrial sector—were cost-competitive and installed 
CHP capacity increased from 12GW in 1980 to 74 GW in 2004 (see essay 2). While CHP 
facilities can still benefit from a 10% investment tax credit, the Energy Policy Act of 
2005 removed the requirement that utilities purchase electricity from CHP facilities and 
instead directed the Utilities to sell their power through competitive markets and coupled 
with high natural gas prices (69% of US CHP plants) resulting in only 5.4GW of CHP 
installed from 2005-2015. Several states have policies to support CHP. However, support 
from the federal government is evidently lacking.  Therefore, insights and 
recommendations from this dissertation (see policy implication section of essay 2) should 
be used to improve the existing policies or to formulate the next generation of CHP 
policies that will ensure evident support at the federal level.   
The study of the economic/market aspect (understanding the profitability using dynamic 
programming and unit commitment) of a V2G reveals that with the present market rules, 
V2G may not be economically viable for the vehicle owners. In the U.S., the V2G policy 
has also not moved beyond the policy analysis stage (see section 1.1 for Policy Stages 
framework), Therefore, the methods and recommendations from this dissertation should 
be explored to analyze, develop and enact an effective V2G policy. Such an effective 
system is only possible by significantly departing from the past (see section 1.1 for 
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punctuated equilibrium) e.g., by creating renewable consumption product (see policy 
implication section of essay 3 for additional examples). 
All these results indicate that thorough analysis of the holistic-triad would reveal the 
hidden intricacies and allow the policymaker to understand the impacts of the policy 
holistically. Thus, the policymaker could make proper trade-offs and reconcile any 
conflicting agendas to formulate, analyze and implement energy policy effectively. In all, 
this dissertation combines engineering tools with insights from social science to study 
three examples of energy policies that are at the intersection of science, technology, 
environment, and society.  
 
The three cases from above are the three upcoming chapters of this dissertation. Chapter 
2 presents the power engineering aspects of a carbon tax. Chapter 3 shows the socio-
political elements of market diffusion of economically viable CHPs and Chapter 4 
explains the economic/market aspects of the V2G in regards to the profitability of the 
electric vehicle owners.  
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2. INTERACTING POLICIES IN POWER SYSTEMS – 
RENEWABLE SUBSIDIES AND A CARBON TAX  
 
2.1 Introduction 
Understanding how any new energy or environmental policy will work in practice 
includes the detailed analysis of existing and future technological, economic, and 
operational contexts. Implementing a carbon tax is no different.  A carbon tax will 
interact with the legacy electricity system and existing energy policies, and its 
implementation has important operational components. Its emission savings that are 
proportional to the power output and tax-related revenue streams, measure the 
effectiveness of a carbon tax. Many studies have examined socioeconomic, socio-
environmental and socio-political perspectives and prior research mostly focuses on 
calculating/predicting emissions saving from a carbon tax [8-13], identifying broader 
economic impacts, and mitigating its negative consequences [14-33]. However, how a 
carbon tax interacts with power system operations is critical but remains understudied 
[34; 35].  
Of the few existing studies that focus on the impact of alternative policies to manage 
carbon on power systems, like a carbon tax or cap and trade program, most study 
transmission congestion from an economic perspective. For example, Limpaitoon et al. 
[34] studied how transmission congestion affects a cap and trade mechanism. They found 
that such interactions might lead to the abuse of market power in the procurement of 
clean energy. Similarly, Sauma [36] studied the effects of transmission congestion on 
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carbon leakage for a cap and trade program. For a carbon tax, Downward [37] and 
Contreas et al. [35] demonstrated some unanticipated impacts of transmission congestion, 
highlighting in [37] that transmission congestion could cause total emissions to increase 
and in [35] demonstrating that transmission congestion may benefit less efficient 
generators. Similarly, Adam et al. [38] found that taxing emissions would change the 
generator dispatch order and alter a carbon tax’s effectiveness [39]. 
This essay falls in the critical gap area of operational interactions of a carbon tax with 
power systems with other similar energy policies. It highlights that the energy policies are 
non-linear in practice. Among other things, such policies could alter system operations 
(e.g., a carbon tax could change market dispatch) and be affected by it (e.g., a market 
dispatch could alter the effectiveness of a carbon tax). Operational interactions could 
result from power system operating conditions like transmission congestion and plant 
outages and interacting energy policies or operational rules like energy policies to 
promote renewables such as the Production Tax Credits (PTCs) or Feed-in Tariffs (FITs). 
In the short term, which ranges from years to decades in the capital-intensive electricity 
system, such operational interactions could undermine the effectiveness of a carbon tax 
and examining these impacts has important value for policy creation and implementation.  
2.1.1 Key Academic Questions 
This essay examines the combined effects of 1) the short-term impacts of transmission 
congestion and 2) price spreads due to other energy policies to promote renewables like 
Production Tax Credits (PTCs). The operation of a power system is simulated using a 
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one-stage forward market, and the critical operational intricacies shaping carbon tax 
implementation in the electric sector are highlighted. 
1. Transmission congestion can influence the effectiveness of a carbon tax when the 
flow of electricity on a transmission line is restricted below its optimal level by 
either physical conditions or operational restrictions. For example, if a 
transmission line rated at 60 MW is carrying 60 MW, it is 100% congested and 
cannot carry any additional power. Transmission line congestion can also alter 
power system operations and change the generator dispatch order. For example, 
according to the U.S. National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) [40], from 
the years 2009 to 2013, 1-4% of total electricity produced from wind generation 
was curtailed mostly due to transmission constraints like transmission congestion 
and lack of transmission access. 
Economists typically study congestion as it relates to the behavior of participants 
[39; 41; 42], and engineers typically study congestion and congestion 
management from a reliability perspective [39; 43-50]. However, from a system-
wide operational perspective, the interactions of congestion and a carbon tax 
provide important insights into policy implementation. Operationally, congestion 
could alter generator dispatch/load demand or change equilibrium prices in a 
power system with a carbon tax, potentially altering its effectiveness. Depending 
on the location of congestion, it could inadvertently force the market to dispatch 
more power from a coal generator and shutdown lower carbon generators, 
undermining emission reductions. 
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2. A carbon tax may also interact with other energy policies like a Production Tax 
Credit (PTC) in the United States or a Feed-in Tariff (FIT) in Germany/United 
Kingdom (UK) /China or some Canadian provinces, which subsidizes electricity 
production from renewable resources to incentivize increased deployment. While 
PTCs have been extremely successful in increasing the profitability and 
deployment of wind generation [51], they also affect electricity market operations. 
Rausch et al. and Philibert et al. [52; 53] find that a carbon tax will positively 
interact with Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) by incentivizing early 
investments in renewables and reducing their long-term cost, which makes 
renewables readily available. However, in electric power system operations, a 
PTC may counteract the effects of a carbon tax [9]. A carbon tax increases the 
overall system price while PTCs decrease it. Presently, electricity generation from 
the wind in the United States gets a $23 PTC [54] for every MWh generated. As a 
result, wind generators expect PTCs and often offer negative bids into the 
wholesale electricity market (see Section 2.2.2). Theoretically, they could bid as 
low as negative $23 and still break even for every MWh generated. Practically, 
they may or may not always bid this low, but they will bid at a lower price than 
other conventional generators. For example, anticipating increasing renewables, 
in 2014 the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) changed the lower 
bound of the negative bid from -$30/MWh to  -$150/MWh [55]. Such prices 
create a difference in the bids among the renewable and conventional generators. 
Throughout this essay, the difference in bids is referred to as a large price 
spread2. 
                                                 
2 A carbon tax can further increase this price spread. It can change the relative price (alternatively 
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These operational interactions could undermine the effective implementation of a carbon 
tax in practice. In both cases, such interactions could alter the emissions savings from a 
carbon tax and alter the revenue collected from loads and paid to generators and the 
government. Analyzing and understanding these interactions will help to estimate the 
impacts of a carbon tax accurately, identify critical issues, and help improve its design. 
Therefore, for a system with large price spreads (due to with PTCs and a carbon tax), I 
study the effectiveness of a carbon tax for both congested and uncongested power 
systems and present the findings in terms of emission savings (proportional to power 
output) and revenue streams for the generators, loads, government and transmission right 
holders. In this essay, I focus on standard U.S. electricity market practices, but this work 
can easily be translated to any electricity market that uses Economic Dispatch (ED) and 
has congestion and a price spread. The contributions of this essay are the demonstration 
and study of two critical examples of operational interactions in power systems with a 
carbon tax, 1) transmission congestion and 2) PTCs and the importance of studying new 
energy policy implementation in the context of operational considerations and existing 
energy policies. 
This essay is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes the background and literature 
review on a carbon tax, U.S. electricity markets, Optimal Power Flow (OPF) and 
Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs). It also describes the measures for evaluating the 
effectiveness of a carbon tax. Section 2.4 describes the methods for operationally 
modeling a carbon tax in power systems. Section 2.5 presents the simulation results and 
discusses the findings in terms of emissions savings (proportional to power output) and 
                                                                                                                                                 
reflected in their bids) of CO2 emitting and non-emitting generators. 
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revenue streams. Section 2.6 discusses some conclusions and identifies policy 
implications. 
2.2 Background  
To operationalize, apply and test the effectiveness of a carbon tax on a power system, a 
discussion on the background of a carbon tax and its interaction with electricity markets 
is critical. This Section will briefly cover each of these topics. Readers who are familiar 
with these topics can skip directly to Section 2.4. 
2.2.1 Carbon Tax 
Many economists argue that a carbon tax is the best approach [56-61] to abate 
greenhouse gases (GHG). A carbon tax can abate GHG and generate government 
revenues that can be used as instruments for fiscal reform. 
According to the World Bank [62], (see Table 2-1), 12 countries and one Canadian 
province have implemented a carbon tax and two countries (marked with an asterisk *) 
have plans to implement one. The situation in the United States is slightly different. Due 
to the current political quagmire, a federal carbon tax is not an immediately plausible 
option. However, states like Washington, New York, Oregon, Massachusetts, and Rhode 
Island are independently pushing for one [63].   
 
Table 2-1: Carbon tax 
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Country/Province Tax Rate3 Adoption Year 
British Columbia (BC) $2012 30/tonCO2e 2008 
Chile* $2018 5/tonCO2e 2018 
Costa Rica 3.5% tax on hydrocarbon-based fossil fuel 1997 
Denmark $2014 31/tonCO2e 1992 
Finland $2014 35/tonCO2e 1990 
France $2014 10/tonCO2e 2014 
Iceland $2014 10/tonCO2e 2010 
Ireland $2014 27.8/tonCO2e 2010 
Japan $2014 2/tonCO2e 2012 
Mexico $2014 10-50/tonCO2e 2012 
Norway $2014 4-69/tonCO2e 1991 
South Africa* $2016 7/tonCO2e 2016 
Sweden $2014 168/tonCO2e 1991 
Switzerland $2014 68/tonCO2e 2008 
United Kingdom $2014 16/tonCO2e 2013 
 
According to Ref [62; 64; 65], 12 countries and one Canadian province are currently implementing a 
carbon tax. 
Theoretically, a carbon tax has its roots linked to the Pigouvian tax [66], which 
internalizes the effects of externalities. For example, consider a fossil-fuel-based power 
plant.  To internalize its negative externalities, this power plant can be taxed. This will 
shift the equilibrium price and quantity from (∆C (P*) $/MWh, P* MW) to (∆C1 (P*) 
$/MWh, P1* MW) which is a decrease in supply and an increase in price [58; 66; 67] 
(see Figure 2-1). 
                                                 
3 A carbon tax, which was not expressed in United States Dollars (USD) by the World Bank, was 
converted to USD using the average yearly exchange rates from the US Forex. 
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Figure 2-1: Marginal supply and demand including a tax.  
A carbon tax is added to the marginal private costs of the supplier to internalize its externalities. 
As mentioned previously, a carbon tax is generally expressed in terms of $/tonCO2e (or 
$/tonC or $/tonCO2) and is applied to the carbon content of the fuel. It is generally 
considered as a cost-effective and easy to apply the method to abate emissions. Once 
applied, it has two dividends [68]. The first dividend is reducing emissions. For example, 
a carbon tax contributed to a 2% emissions reduction in Norway for a period of 9 years 
(1990-1999), a 1.69% emissions reduction in Finland for a period of 11 years (1997 – 
2008) and a 13% emissions reduction in British Columbia for a period of 6 years 
(average of 2000-2007 pre-tax emissions vs. average of 2008-2013 post-tax emissions) 
[8; 10; 12; 69]. The second dividend is increased government revenues. For example, 
Milne et al. [67] show that the total revenue from environmental taxes (taxes on carbon 
and other pollutants) for Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
countries for a period of 8 years (2000-2009) was around 2% to 2.5% of their Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). According to the New York Times [70], Ireland collected over 
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a billion Euros in three years from 2010-2012 from its carbon tax. And projections of 
carbon tax performance are rosy: Poterba [71] predicts that a carbon tax could increase 
Japan’s Gross National Product (GNP) by 1.6%, and Rausch et al. [52] predict that a 
gradually increasing carbon tax of $20/tonCO2 in the United States could raise around 
$1.5 trillion in revenue in 10 years. I recognize that discussions of revenue distribution 
are fundamentally important; otherwise, a carbon tax could have negative distributional 
impacts (i.e., the poor will end up paying more than the rich pay), as are interactions with 
other taxes and carbon leakage. However, they are not the focus of this essay [12; 27; 72; 
73], which concentrates on operational and policy interactions.   
2.2.2 Basics of U.S. Electricity Markets 
Presently, over 66% [74] of the electricity load in the United States is served by 
wholesale electricity markets4. As shown in Figure 2-2, generally, the resellers buy 
electricity in the wholesale markets and resell it in the retail markets. Utilities generally 
act as the resellers, and the end users (residential, industrial and commercial customers) 
are the ones who consume the electricity. The end users or load generally purchase 
electricity through retail markets; however, a discussion on retail markets is beyond the 
scope of this essay. 
                                                 
4 The remaining population is served by over-the-counter and bilateral trading agreements. 
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Figure 2-2: Electricity markets in the United States.  
Such markets can broadly be divided into the wholesale and retail market. Discussion on the retail markets 
is outside the scope of this essay. 
At the wholesale level, Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) and Independent 
System Operators (ISOs) are voluntary organizations authorized by the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) with the responsibilities of running the wholesale 
markets and maintaining the day-to-day reliability of the power grid. In this essay, I will 
refer them as market operators. At present, there are seven RTOs/ISOs in the United 
States. Figure 2-3 shows the ISO/RTO controlled regions of the United States and 
Canada. 
In the U.S., the markets are settled using a two-settlement system with a day-ahead 
market and a real-time or spot market. In both markets, the prices are determined by 
matching supply and demand. However, the key difference lies in the fact that the day-
ahead market settles in anticipation of future events and the real-time market settles in 
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real-time. The real-time market reconciles the difference between the day-ahead cleared 
demand and the real-time load. In both markets, the market operator collects supply bids 
from the generators and matches them with demand. These bids are in the form of 
price/MW pairs (see Section 2.4.2) and are used to construct a supply curve for each 
generator along with their maximum and minimum power values. The market operator 
then runs some form of Unit Commitment (UC) followed by security constrained 
economic dispatch (or Optimal Power Flow (OPF)) to dispatch the least-cost generation 
to meet demand and determine prices. This illustrates the operational complexities in 
running a market. If a carbon tax were applied in such a market, the operational 
complications would alter the anticipated impacts of this tax 
 
Figure 2-3: RTOs/ISOs in the United States and Canada 
Electricity in the United States is generally traded through state of the art wholesale electricity markets run 
by these ISOs/RTOs [74] 
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This essay assumes a real-time spot market and simulates the market dispatch. Prices in 
such markets are more dynamic and interesting. Moreover, they include real-time 
contingencies. However, the results can easily be extended to day-ahead markets with 
some minor changes. 
As mentioned earlier, in the real-time market the market operator runs an OPF and 
dispatches generators economically. OPF combines the power flow with the economic 
dispatch problem. In other words, OPF aims to dispatch the least-cost portfolio of 
generators when subjected to power-system constraints. The ISO/RTO “generally” solves 
this OPF problem using a linearized version known as a Direct Current Optimal Power 
Flow (DCOPF), in which the reactive power and branch resistances are neglected, and all 
voltage magnitudes are assumed to be one per unit (p.u.). 
The solution to this optimization problem results in the dispatch of the least-cost 
generators, and the solution to the dual problem determines the prices, called LMPs, at 
each node. LMP is defined as the least-cost of supplying the next increment or decrement 
of demand at a location when all power systems constraints are met. For example, using a 
linear marginal supply and demand curve for a given location and assuming no tax, as 
shown in Figure 2-1, ∆C (P*) is the LMP and P* is the optimal amount of power 
generation if all power system constraints are met. 
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2.3 Key Policy Questions 
As mentioned in the previous sections, during the actual implementation of a Carbon tax, 
operational/engineering and existing policy interactions could become significant. 
Therefore, this essay seeks answers to the following policy questions 
A) Do we need to thoroughly evaluate energy policies in the context of their 
engineering aspects like existing power systems operation and the policy 
environment? 
B) Could such aspects undermine or overshoot the effectiveness of the energy policy 
in question? 
 
2.4 Methods  
Though the behavioral interactions among generators and loads, modeled using a Cournot 
game [39; 75; 76], and long-term capacity planning [77; 78] are also interesting 
interactions to explore, this essay is limited to the operational interactions between a 
carbon tax and both transmission congestion and PTCs. First, a carbon tax is 
operationalized, and four scenarios are created. These scenarios use various combinations 
of carbon tax and transmission congestion. After that, OPF is solved for each scenario. 
Since modeling information for actual systems is critical infrastructure information and 
not publicly available, the one area 28-bus IEEE Reliability Test System (RTS) was used. 
Some modifications were made to the IEEE RTS model to mimic actual system 
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conditions in the United States and balance its simplicity with the needs. These 
modifications are described below. 
2.4.1 The IEEE RTS Model 
In the IEEE RTS model (see Figure 2-4), there are 33 generators (hydro, oil, coal and 
nuclear), 17 loads and 28 buses (nodes). However, this is an old test system with an old 
generation mix, and without modification, it would fail to mimic a present-day power 
system. The generation mix in the original IEEE RTS system does not have enough 
renewables, and it does not have any natural gas generators. To address the first problem, 
the oil generators at bus seven were converted into wind generators. This added 300 MW 
of renewables to the total system capacity. The cost coefficients of these new renewable 
generators were set like those of existing hydro generators (see Table 2-2).  
To address the second problem, generators U197 (bus 13) and U12 (bus 15) were 
converted into natural gas generators. It was assumed that natural gas generators cost 
1/5th that of the U12 oil generator. Given natural gas and oil prices over the last couple of 
years, this was a reasonable assumption. 
Apart from adding renewable and natural gas generators, to make the dispatch more 
economical only 27 of the 33 generators were committed, and the loads were set at 110% 
of their rated capacity. Derating the transmission lines 14-16 to 40-50% of their rated 
values created real-time transmission congestion in the spot market. 
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Figure 2-4: 28 bus IEEE Reliability Test System (with modifications).  
This system is widely used for conducting reliability studies. This model is expanded in this essay and is 
used to illustrate interactions of a carbon tax with existing policies and with the power systems. 
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Table 2-2: Generation mix in a modified IEEE RTS model.  
Generator 
Name 
Generator 
Type 
Power (MW) Bidding coefficients Status 
Min Max a 
($/h) 
b 
($/MWh) 
c 
($/MW2h) 
U12 Natural gas 2.4 12.0 17.27 11.31 0.06 Online 
U20 Oil 0.0 20.0 400.68 130.00 0.00 Offline 
U50 Renewable 0.0 50.0 0.00 27.00 0.00 Online 
U76 Coal 15.2 76.0 212.30 16.08 0.01 Online 
U100 Renewable 0.0 100.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 Online 
U155 Coal 54.3 155.0 382.23 12.38 0.01 Online 
U197 Natural gas 68.9 197.0 17.27 11.31 0.06 Online 
U350 Coal 140.0 350.0 665.10 11.84 0.01 Online 
U400 Nuclear 100.0 400.0 395.11 4.41 0.00 Online 
 
2.4.2 Operationalizing a Carbon Tax 
As mentioned earlier, Pigouvian taxes [66], which are equal to marginal damages, are 
imposed on top of a supplier’s Marginal Private Cost (MPC) (see Section 2.2.1). The 
MPC of a supplier is defined in equation (1).  
𝑴𝑷𝑪 = ∆𝑪(𝑷) =
𝜹𝑪(𝑷)
𝜹𝑷
= 𝟐𝒄𝑷 + 𝒃                                                                          (1) 
$22/tonCO2e is chosen to be the value for marginal damage. This value is on par with the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) estimate, which assumed a 5% discount 
level [79]. Since the CO2e emissions per MWh for each power plant are different, a 
carbon tax in $/tonCO2e is converted into a carbon tax
5 in $/MWh using equation (2). 
𝜹 (
$
𝑴𝑾𝒉
)  =   𝒄𝒂𝒓𝒃𝒐𝒏_𝒕𝒂𝒙 (
$
𝒕𝒐𝒏𝑪𝑶𝟐𝒆
)  ∗  𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍_𝒆𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏_𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓 (
𝒕𝒐𝒏𝑪𝑶𝟐𝒆
𝑴𝑾𝒉
)            
 (2) 
                                                 
5 Generally, a tax in $/MWh is referred to as an energy tax. Such a tax does not differentiate between clean and unclean generators. 
However, the carbon tax used in this dissertation, though expressed in $/MWh, is selectively applied to generators based on their 
carbon intensity. Thus, it allows for substitution and encourages competition. 
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The sensitivity of the value of carbon tax is illustrated by varying it from $0/tonCO2e to 
$22/tonCO2e in five discrete steps as shown in Table 2-3. 
Table 2-3:  Operating parameters of the simulation model 
Power 
Plant Type 
Emissions 
Factor 
(
𝒍𝒃𝑪𝑶𝟐𝒆
𝑴𝑾𝒉
) 
Tax 
(
$
𝒕𝒐𝒏𝑪𝑶𝟐𝒆
) 
Tax 
(
$
𝑴𝑾𝒉
) 
Coal 2,000 [0, 5, 11, 16, 22] 
 
 
[0, 5, 10, 15, 20] ➔ coal 
[0, 3, 6, 9, 12] ➔ natural gas 
  
Natural gas 1,200  
Renewable N/A 
Hydro N/A 
Nuclear N/A 
The above columns illustrate the translation of a carbon tax expressed in 
$/tonCO2e into a carbon tax expressed in $/MWh for coal and natural gas 
plants (i.e., a carbon tax of $22/tonCO2e was translated to a $20/MWh 
carbon tax for coal plants and a $12/MWh carbon tax for natural gas plants. 
 
Power plant type, emission factor, and tax [62; 79-82] 
With a carbon tax (𝜹), the Marginal Social Cost (MSC) of the supplier is given by 
equations (3) and (4). 
𝑴𝑺𝑪 = 𝑴𝑷𝑪 + 𝜹                                                                                  (3) 
 𝑀𝑆𝐶 =  2𝑐𝑃 + 𝑏 + 𝛿                                                             (4) 
Therefore, from equations (2) and (4), the total cost curve of a generator with a carbon 
tax is shown in equation (5). 
𝑪𝟏(𝑷) = 𝒄𝑷𝟐 + (𝒃 + 𝜹)𝑷 + 𝒂            
  𝑪𝟏(𝑷) =  𝒄𝑷𝟐 + (𝒃 +  𝒄𝒂𝒓𝒃𝒐𝒏_𝒕𝒂𝒙 ∗  𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍_𝒆𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏_𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓 )𝑷 + 𝒂       (5) 
 
       
 
32 
2.4.3 Simulation 
The following simulation methodology was used to perform the simulations as shown in 
Figure 2-5: 
1. A large price spread (or equivalently a large wind production subsidy) was 
created to mimic the difference in costs between renewable and conventional 
generators. 
2. Transmission lines were derated to create transmission congestion, and a carbon 
tax value was chosen and used to create four scenarios.  Scenarios 1 and 2 
represented an uncongested system, and Scenarios 3 and 4 represented a 
congested system. 
Scenario 1 (base case): An uncongested system without a carbon tax. 
Scenario 2: An uncongested system with a carbon tax.  
Scenario 3: A congested system without a carbon tax.  
Scenario 4: A congested system with a carbon tax. 
3. Solve the DCOPF. 
4. To illustrate the sensitivity of the results to the value of the carbon tax, the carbon 
tax was varied in five discrete steps. The carbon tax for coal generators was 
increased from $0/MWh to $20/MWh, and for natural gas generators was 
increased from $0/MWh to $12/MWh (see Table 2-3). 
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5. To illustrate the sensitivity of the results to the amount of transmission 
congestion, its intensity was varied. Transmission lines 14-16 and 7-8 were 
derated to 40% and 50% of their rated MW capacity. 
 
Figure 2-5: Simulation Methodology.  
IEEE-RTS model is modified, after that, a carbon tax is applied and then power flow is solved to analyze 
the results. 
2.4.4 Effectiveness Measures 
The effectiveness of a carbon tax is evaluated in terms of emission savings (proportional 
to power output) and revenue streams for the generators, loads, transmission right holders 
and government. All the measures of effectiveness are the direct result of the market 
dispatch order. 
2.4.4.1 Emission Savings and Power Output 
Power output and emission savings are interrelated. The power output of each generator 
is determined by the OPF solution. Once the OPF solution is known, emissions for each 
generator can be calculated by multiplying its output by its marginal emissions factor. If 
there are N generators, total system emission can be calculated using equation (6). 
𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍_𝒆𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 =  ∑ 𝑷𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓_𝒐𝒖𝒕𝒑𝒖𝒕𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒊  ∗  𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍_𝒆𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏_𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒊
𝑵
𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒊=𝟏
                          (6) 
Chose a 
model
Create  
price 
spread and 
congestion
Apply a 
carbon tax 
to the 
scenarios
Solve 
DCOPF
Results
Sensitivity 
analysis
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2.4.4.2 Revenue Streams 
In electricity market settlements, payments flow from the loads to the generators, 
transmission right holders and government. In this essay, I express the revenue streams in 
terms of Net Benefits (NB) and change in Net Benefits (∆NB). For a generator, its net 
benefit, or profit, is the difference between its revenues and costs as shown in equation 
(7). For load, its net benefit is the difference between its willingness to pay and its costs 
as shown in equation (8), 
𝑵𝒆𝒕 𝑩𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒇𝒊𝒕 (𝑵𝑩𝑮) = 𝑳𝑴𝑷𝑮 ∗ 𝑷𝑮 −  (𝒄 ∗ 𝑷𝑮
𝟐 +  𝒃 ∗ 𝑷𝑮 + 𝒂) −  𝒕𝒂𝒙 ∗ 𝑷𝑮                                           (7) 
𝑵𝒆𝒕 𝑩𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒇𝒊𝒕 (𝑵𝑩𝑳) =  (𝒄 ∗ 𝑷𝑳
𝟐 +  𝒃 ∗ 𝑷𝑳 + 𝒂) −  𝑳𝑴𝑷𝑳 ∗ 𝑷𝑳                                                             (8) 
Where, 
P is the amount of power generated/consumed, LMP is the Locational Marginal Price, 
and a, b and c are the cost/benefit coefficients of the generators and loads. 
Net benefits for the government are its tax revenues, and for Financial Transmission 
Rights (FTR) holders are its congestion rents as shown in equation (9), 
𝑵𝒆𝒕 𝑩𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒇𝒊𝒕 (𝑵𝑩𝑮𝒐𝒗) =   ∑ 𝒕𝒂𝒙𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒊 ∗ 𝑷𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒊
𝑵
𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒊=𝟏
.                                                              (9) 
𝑵𝒆𝒕 𝑩𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒇𝒊𝒕 (𝑵𝑩𝑭𝑻𝑹) =   𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕  
Where, 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 is the total congestion revenue on the system. 
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To understand the sensitivity of the net benefits to the amount of the carbon tax, the 
change in the net benefits is calculated for each entity. Letting at represent after tax and 
bt represent before tax, the change in the net benefits (∆NB) is shown in equation (10).  
 ∆𝑵𝑩 =  𝑵𝑩𝒂𝒕 − 𝑵𝑩𝒃𝒕           (10) 
2.5 Results and Discussion 
For each scenario, the MW output, emission savings, and revenue streams are shown in 
Table 2-4
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Table 2-4: Summary of Results 
 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2  Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
 
 
40% 
transmission 
derating 
50% transmission 
derating 
40% transmission 
derating 
50% transmission 
derating 
Act. Chg. Act. Chg. Act. Chg. Act. Chg. Act. Chg. 
 
 
Output 
(MW) 
  
Coal 1,274 1,274 0 1,153 -9 1,173 -8 1,152 -10 1,173 -8 
Natural gas 461 461 0 582 26 651 41 583 26 651 41 
Nuclear 800 800 0 800 0 681 -15 800 0 681 -15 
Renewables 600 600 0 600 0 600 0 600 0 600 0 
Total 3,135 3,135 0 3,135 0 3,105 -1 3,135 0 3,105 -1 
Emissions 
(tons of 
CO2e) 
Coal 1,156 1,156 0 1,046 -9 1,064 -8 1,045 -10 1,064 -8 
Natural gas 251 251 0 317 26 354 41 317 26 354 41 
Total 1,407 1,407 0 1,363 -3 1,418 1 1,362 -3 1,418 1 
Generator 
Net 
Benefits 
($)  
Coal 15,292 5,100 -67 8,996 -41 1,329,205 8,592 4,010 -74 1,282,273 8,285 
Natural gas 4,391 4,392 0 5,975 36 1,259,586 28,588 6,458 47 1,243,962 28,232 
Nuclear 18,699 28,299 51 6,871 -63 7,430 -60 22,827 22 7,430 -60 
Renewables 10,722 17,922 67 8,109 -24 667,374 6,124 17,613 64 667,374 6,124 
Other 
Revenues 
Load -90,507 
-
128,127 
-42 -88,907 2 -4,678,337 -5,069 -133,824 -48 -4,678,337 -5,069 
($) 
Government + 
FTR holders 
0 31,017  N/A 15,460 N/A 1,369,200 N/A 39,412  N/A 1,400,478 N/A 
In the table, Act. refers actual value and Chg. refers to percentage change from the base case. Scenario 1 is the base case. Scenario 2 is a case without congestion 
and 22$/tonCO2e. Scenario 3 is the case with congestion and without a carbon tax. Scenario 4 is a case with congestion and 22 $/tonCO2e. The results indicate 
that a carbon tax would improve the net benefits of renewables but would not effectively reduce emissions. Additionally, depending on the location, transmission 
congestion could improve or diminish the impact of a carbon tax.     
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2.5.1 No Emission Savings with Large Price Spread 
Scenario 2: As shown in Table 2-4, a carbon tax had no impact on total emissions 
without congestion because the price spread among generators was large. When 
renewables are significantly cheaper than other generators, they are always dispatched at 
their maximum rated capacity. A carbon tax is applied to decrease the output from the 
coal and natural gas generators and increase the output from the renewables. However, 
since the renewables are already generating at their maximum rated capacity, they cannot 
increase their output. Therefore, the output from the coal and natural gas generators will 
remain unchanged, and their emissions will not be reduced. In this case, only decreasing 
demand could reduce emissions. 
Scenario 3: Transmission congestion, irrespective of any carbon tax or subsidies, could 
significantly alter the generator dispatch and therefore total emissions. For example, 
when a transmission line connecting a renewable is congested, a coal generator could 
replace its output. Therefore, total system emissions would increase. Conversely, when a 
transmission line connecting a coal generator is congested, its output could be replaced 
by a renewable. Therefore, total system emissions would decrease. As shown in Table 
2-4, when lines were derated to 50% of rated capacity, total system emissions increased 
by about 1% from the base case, and when lines were derated to 40% of rated capacity, 
total system emissions decreased by 3% from the base case. For the 50% transmission 
derating case, both coal and natural gas generators were dispatched to replace the 
curtailed output of the nuclear generators. Thus, total system emissions increased. 
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Whereas, for the 40% transmission derating case, the natural gas generators were 
dispatched to replace the curtailed output of the coal generators. Thus, total system 
emissions decreased. 
Scenario 4: A carbon tax again did not reduce total emissions because the price spread 
among generators was large. However, irrespective of the carbon tax, congestion had a 
significant impact on emissions reductions like Scenario 3. 
In summary, in the short run: 
• Large price spreads result in renewables being dispatched at their maximum rated 
capacity. Therefore, a carbon tax would be ineffective in reducing emissions. 
• Congestion in a power system can significantly alter the generator dispatch, and 
thus change the magnitude and direction of the anticipated emissions savings. 
2.5.2 Revenue Streams – Who Earns and Who Pays 
2.5.2.1 Renewables – Benefit from a Carbon Tax 
Scenario 2:  Taxing emissions in an uncongested system will increase total system costs 
and increase LMPs. Therefore; the net benefits to renewable generators will increase. As 
shown in Table 2-4, the addition of a $22/tonCO2e tax increased the net benefits of the 
renewables by 67% from the base case. If Pbt = Pat = Pmax, the change in the net benefits 
of the renewables is Pmax (LMPat - LMPbt). Since LMPat > LMPbt and Pmax>0, the change 
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in the net benefits is positive. This result illustrates that renewables would become the 
beneficiaries of a carbon tax and would reap additional benefits at no extra cost. 
Scenario 3:  Depending on the location and intensity of the congestion, the net benefits 
of the renewables could change significantly. For example, when transmission lines were 
derated to 50% of rated capacity, the net benefits of the renewables increased by 
approximately 6,000%, and when transmission lines were derated to 40% of rated 
capacity, the net benefits of the renewables increased by only approximately 24%. Had 
the transmission capacity reductions been on different lines, the dispatch order of the 
generators would have changed, and the revenue streams for the renewables would also 
have changed. 
Scenario 4:  The net benefits of the renewables for Scenario 4 were like those of 
Scenario 3, except when the transmission lines were derated to 40% of rated capacity. 
Again, depending on the location and intensity of the congestion, the net benefits of the 
renewables could change significantly. 
2.5.2.2 Coal and Natural Gas Carbon Tax Payment Depends on 
Congestion 
Scenario 2: In an uncongested power system, unless compensated by an increase in 
LMPs, coal and natural gas generators will lose revenue due to a carbon tax, and their 
change in net benefits will be either zero or negative. It will be zero for marginal 
generators, and it will be negative for inframarginal generators. For a marginal 
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generator6, LMPat = LMPbt + tax and if Pat = Pbt, then the change in the net benefits will 
be zero. For others, if (LMPat -LMPbt ) < tax (i.e., the change in LMP does not 
compensate for the tax) and if Pat = Pbt, then the change in the net benefits will be 
negative.  
Scenario 3:  Depending on the location and intensity of the congestion, the net benefits 
of the coal and natural gas generators could change significantly. As shown in Table 2-4, 
when transmission lines were derated to 50% of rated capacity, the net benefits of the 
coal generators increased by over 8,000% from the base case, and the net benefits of the 
natural gas generators increased by over 28,000% from the base case. Similarly, when 
transmission lines were derated to 40% of rated capacity, the net benefits of the coal 
generators decreased by 41% from the base case, and the net benefits of the natural gas 
generators increased by 36% from the base case. 
Scenario 4: Like Scenario 3, the net-benefits of the coal and natural gas generators are 
heavily influenced by the location and intensity of the transmission congestion as shown 
in Table 2-4. 
In summary, in the short run, 
• Irrespective of the price spreads, the change in the net benefits of the coal and 
natural gas generators would be either zero (for marginal generators) or negative 
(for inframarginal generators - unless compensated by an increase in LMP). 
                                                 
6In Scenario 2, the natural gas generator U197 is the marginal generator. 
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• Congestion, depending on its location and intensity, could significantly change 
the magnitude and direction of the revenue streams of the coal and natural gas 
generators. 
2.5.2.3 Load and Government  
Scenarios 1, 2, 3 and 4: As shown in Table 2-4, for all scenarios, at the end of the day 
load pays all costs. A carbon tax would increase system costs and LMPs and thus 
decrease the net benefits of the load. If load remains constant (𝑃𝐿𝑏𝑡= 𝑃𝐿𝑎𝑡  =𝑃𝐿), the 
change in the net benefits, ∆NB 𝐿= 𝑃𝐿 (𝐿𝑀𝑃𝐿𝑏𝑡 − 𝐿𝑀𝑃𝐿𝑎𝑡), is negative since 𝐿𝑀𝑃𝐿𝑏𝑡 <
 𝐿𝑀𝑃𝐿𝑎𝑡. The change in the net benefits is positive when 𝐿𝑀𝑃𝐿𝑏𝑡 >  𝐿𝑀𝑃𝐿𝑎𝑡  and this can 
only happen if congestion is present. For example, in Scenario 4 when transmission lines 
were derated to 50% of rated capacity, the load at bus 16 consumed 110 MW and 
received $7.22 thousand (110 𝑀𝑊ℎ × −$65.64/𝑀𝑊ℎ). The change in the net benefits 
for the load was thus positive (since 𝐿𝑀𝑃𝐿𝑏𝑡 >  𝐿𝑀𝑃𝐿𝑎𝑡). Negative LMPs are not rare in 
U.S. electricity markets [83-88]. Areas with high wind often have negative wholesale 
prices [83], and loads who purchase energy in these regions can make money by 
consuming power and thus increase their net benefits. 
Like congestion, a large price spread could alter load revenues. The total system cost of a 
power system with both a large price spread, and a carbon tax is less than with just a 
carbon tax. This is because, with a large price spread, renewables are less expensive.  A 
carbon tax would increase the amount paid by the load, and the price spread would 
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decrease it. The net change in payment depends on the tax rate and price spread. A large 
price spread would offset the effect of a carbon tax and change the amount paid by the 
load. 
In summary, in the short run: 
• A Large price spread would lower the total system cost and would lower the 
amount paid by the load, which would offset the effects of a carbon tax. 
• Congestion could interact with a carbon tax and change the amount paid by the 
load. Thus, both revenues (congestion rents and carbon taxes) should be carefully 
recycled to minimize any negative distributional impacts. 
2.5.3 Sensitivity of the Results 
To test the sensitivity of the results to different assumptions I varied the value of the 
carbon tax and the amount of congestion; the carbon tax was varied from $0/tonCO2e to 
$22/tonCO2e in five steps and the transmission lines 14-16 and 7-8 were derated to 40% 
and 50% of their rated values (over 90% of actual carbon taxes are less than $22/tonCO2e 
[89]. For the changes in the carbon tax, the results show that in a system with a large 
price spread, all else being equal, the emission savings may be insensitive to the changes 
in the carbon tax, but the revenue streams may be sensitive to them. For example, 
contrary to popular belief [8; 10; 11; 90-94], in a system with large price spreads and 
fixed transmission congestion, increasing the carbon tax did not decrease emissions, but it 
did increase the benefits to the renewables and the monetary burden to load. 
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Besides, the results suggest that in a system with large price spreads, all else being equal, 
both emission savings and revenue streams would be sensitive to the location and 
intensity of the congestion. If transmission congestion curtails the output of a coal 
generator, then total emissions would be reduced. However, if it curtails the output of 
renewable generators, then emissions would increase. For example, derating line 7-8 
would curtail the output of the U100 renewable generators. Thus, total system emissions 
would increase. 
2.6 Conclusion 
Power plants are the largest stationary sources of GHG around the world; in many 
countries, a carbon tax may be an effective method to mitigate these emissions.  
Successful implementation of a carbon tax requires understanding how a carbon tax will 
change power system operations and be shaped by the existing policy and operational 
context of the electric power system. While a carbon tax has significant theoretical 
advantages, power systems operating conditions, like transmission congestion and large 
price spreads (due to subsidies created by other energy policies), can alter carbon-tax 
effectiveness, especially in the short run. I examined the impact of a carbon tax in a 
wholesale electricity market with and without congestion and with large price spreads 
and using a modified IEEE RTS 28-bus model. I then evaluated the effectiveness of this 
tax in terms of emission savings and revenue streams for generators, loads and the 
government. I focused on standard U.S. electricity market practices, but the results are 
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equally applicable to any electricity market that uses Economic Dispatch (ED) and has 
congestion and legacy energy policies that create price spreads. 
The results show that a large price spread could change the generator dispatch, 
reduce average prices, and diminish the carbon tax effectiveness. For a system with a 
large price spread and without the proper mechanisms for recycling tax revenues, a 
carbon tax may not reduce emissions, and it could increase the revenues for renewables at 
the expense of electricity consumers. However, in the longer term, a carbon tax could 
provide important incentives for the construction of low-carbon generation resources. If 
power system operational aspects were not studied, these interactions would never be 
highlighted, and the predicted effectiveness of a carbon tax would be significantly 
different from the actual effectiveness. 
2.7 Policy Implications 
This essay answers the key policy questions raised in section 2.3. The major policy 
implications from this research are twofold. First, any new energy policy needs to be 
evaluated in the context of the existing power system operations and energy policy 
environment. Second, implementation of a carbon tax could be undermined—in the short 
term—by existing power system operating conditions and existing policies.  
A carbon tax remains a popular policy instrument to abate GHG, and the power sector is 
a prime candidate for a carbon tax because power plants are stationary, their emissions 
are accurately monitored and recorded, and they are owned and operated by a small 
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number of companies. Abating emissions from this sector could provide significant GHG 
reductions cost-effectively.  Several countries are considering implementing a price on 
carbon. For example, the liberal party in Canada just announced its carbon tax plan for 
2018 [95]. This plan encourages the remaining Canadian provinces to levy a carbon tax 
that increases from a minimum of $10/tonCO2e in 2018 to $50/tonCO2e in 2022. Another 
example is China. Starting in 2017, China is launching a full-fledged emission trading 
scheme, with an auction price ranging from ~$2/tonCO2e to ~$16/tonCO2e
7 [96],  for 
curbing its CO2e emissions. Similarly, several U.S. states like Massachusetts, 
Washington, Vermont, Oregon, and Rhode Island are also considering a carbon tax [97-
99].  When these countries or its provinces/states tax the emissions from power plants, 
the tax will be implemented on legacy energy systems with a suite of existing policies 
(e.g., FIT in China/Germany/UK or parts of Canada, PTCs in the United States, 
Renewable Portfolio Standards in the United States or Canadian provinces) that could 
influence the effectiveness of a tax.  Policymakers would need to decide on a carbon tax 
rate and predict its effectiveness both in terms of emissions savings and the revenues 
generated from the tax. Until now, it has been a common trend to study only the 
economic, environmental and political interactions of a carbon tax. During actual 
implementation, operational and existing policy interactions become significant. In the 
short term, power system operating conditions, like transmission congestion and 
interacting energy policies to promote renewables, could undermine the effectiveness of a 
carbon tax – each of these is described below. 
                                                 
7 These numbers are based on the pilot emission trading schemes in China. 
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1. In Sections 2.2.1 and 2.5.1, I show how a large price spread, like that created by a 
PTC, can undermine emissions reductions. While a carbon tax should penalize the 
polluter (not incentivize a non-polluter) and reduce emissions, existing energy 
policies could interact with the tax implementation. Many regions in the United 
States currently have a large price spread due to subsidies like PTCs, which 
incentivizes renewable deployment. Therefore, examining policy interactions is 
particularly important in these regions before a carbon tax is adopted. Otherwise, 
a carbon tax may not effectively reduce emissions. 
2. Sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 (Scenarios 3 & 4) showed how power system operational 
issues, like transmission congestion, could change the generator dispatch and 
completely alter the anticipated emission savings and revenue streams from a 
carbon tax. Ensuring that policymakers understand the interactions between 
wholesale electricity markets and a new tax is critical.  
These policy and operational contexts can interact with one another. For example, the 
Mid-Continent Independent System Operator (MISO) region of the United States is 
facing significant transmission congestion due to increasing levels of wind that cannot be 
delivered to load, capacity reserves that are concentrated in the west and central regions, 
and administrative and institutional difference at the borders with other system operators 
[100]. Therefore, if the emission savings and revenue streams from a carbon tax were 
calculated for this region, without taking congestion and price spread into account, their 
ex-ante values would be significantly different from their ex-post values. 
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Power system operations and the existing policy environment will shape the 
implementation of new energy policy initiatives in important ways.  As I have shown in 
this work, traditional economic models fail to highlight these important interactions 
between a carbon tax, congestion and price spread. While the specific numbers presented 
in this essay cannot be extrapolated to a real system, the results demonstrate that 
power system conditions and legacy policies influence the price spread, which affects 
both the magnitude and the sign of system-wide GHG and the flow of revenue 
streams caused by a carbon tax. The results show that in a system with a large price 
spread, without proper recycling mechanisms for both tax and congestion revenues, a 
carbon tax may be ineffective in reducing emissions and may increase the revenue of 
renewables at the expense of electricity consumers.  Therefore, understanding these 
interactions will help improve the design of a carbon tax or any new energy policy 
initiative and ensure its effectiveness. 
2.8 Limitations and Further Research 
While a lot of effort was put into improving the model and methods, this research used 
basic market principles to simulate using an IEEE test model. Therefore, an interesting 
avenue for further research would be to use real data to conduct a similar experiment.  
2.9 My Contributions 
The work presented in this essay is a part of a collaborative effort with Professor Bruce F. 
Wollenberg (University of Minnesota), Professor Elizabeth J. Wilson (Dartmouth 
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College) and Dr. Anthony Giacomoni (Pennsylvania Jersey Maryland Interconnection 
LLC). I was the primary researcher, and my contributions are concept creation, literature 
review, gap-identification, mathematical formulation, analysis, result inference, and the 
content write-up. Prof. Elizabeth J.  Wilson and Dr. Anthony Giacomoni were 
responsible for editorial advice and concept refinement. Being the author of the Unit 
Commitment program that was used in this essay, Prof. Bruce F. Wollenberg was 
responsible for technical guidance.  A shorter version of this essay is published in 
Elsevier Energy, [101] DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2017.06.004  
2.10 Acknowledgement 
I want to thank my collaborators for helping me in shaping this work. I would also like to 
thank Dr. Stephen Rose (Mid Continent ISO) and Sarah Cronk (Deloitte Consulting) for 
proofreading and commenting on the preliminary versions of this essay.    
       
 
49 
3.  NON-FINANCIAL BARRIERS TO COMBINED HEAT AND 
POWER IN THE UNITED STATES – A QUALITATIVE 
STUDY 
3.1 Introduction  
Imperatives to create reliable and resilient energy systems in the face of shifting climate 
and weather risks while reducing energy sector Greenhouse Gases (GHG) and other 
environmental emissions from electricity, heat, and transportation are driving countries to 
support the deployment of low-carbon energy systems, including large and small-scale 
renewable generation and by improving end-use energy efficiency. While many research 
projects focus on electricity or transportation sectors, fewer explore the integration of 
heat into future energy mixes. Combined Heat and Power (CHP) systems can fill several 
interesting niches; the technology can reduce GHG by utilizing heat that would be 
otherwise wasted in generating electricity [102], they can provide low-carbon heating and 
cooling depending on the fuel source (biomass, natural or renewable gas, waste, or coal); 
and if designed for operational flexibility, they can enhance system resilience and help 
integrate variable renewable resources into energy systems [103]. 
CHP is a low-risk and mature technology, widely used around the world for industrial 
processes and heating and cooling residential and commercial buildings. While CHP 
plants were initially developed to fulfill electricity and heating needs, newer CHP plants 
are being deployed that can rapidly start-up and ramp their power output can, with 
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associated water storage tanks, also provide "flexibility" to the electrical grid to aid in 
integrating variable energy sources like wind and solar [104]. Local energy and heat 
generated by CHP plants can also enhance local energy system reliability in the face of 
storms or large-scale power loss [105]. 
Over 50% of the electricity generated in Denmark and over 30% of electricity generated 
in Russia comes from CHP; in the United States, only eight percent of electricity is 
produced from CHP [106]. While the U.S. Department of Energy estimates a technical 
potential of 240 GW [105], the U.S. has installed 83 GW. Lower energy costs in the 
United States make some projects un-economic, but non-financial barriers also stand in 
the way of CHP projects.  
There has been a significant amount of work in understanding the low rates of adoption 
of energy efficiency technologies, compared to their technical potential.  This 
discrepancy is often described as the “energy paradox” or “energy-efficiency gap” [107], 
which implies consumers behave irrationally [108] as the economic calculations are 
favorable.  However, there are has been very little work on the “gap” in CHP adoption. 
Previous studies on CHP have generally focused on financial barriers. For example, the 
state-by-state study of CHP in the United States [109] identify financial barriers like 
"spark spread,” standby rates, and project financing as the primary barriers.  Only very 
rarely non-economic barriers are highlighted. For example, Stowe [110] identifies the 
utility business model and lack of education as significant barriers for CHP in the data 
centers. Similarly, Hampson [105] identifies unclear value proposition, market and non-
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market uncertainties, awareness among the decision makers and local siting/permitting as 
major barriers and Stowe [110] identify lack of existing policies as a major barrier.  
Similarly, one study in the United States studies and one in the United Kingdom (U.K.) 
[111] include organizational barriers that make financially viable CHP projects 
unattractive. The U.K. study is the only one that identifies barriers related to the influence 
of individual agency, i.e., the beliefs and actions of different people; independent of the 
social structure they work within. Keeping everything else constant (profitability of CHP, 
its ownership structure and the knowledge about CHP within the organization), an 
econometric study by [112] finds complex regulatory requirements to be a barrier for 
CHP adoption. A handful of other studies from the European Union talk about the non-
financial barriers. For example, Vietor et al. [113] finds the most prominent barriers to 
diffusion of CHP in Germany Ruhr Valley are the lack of CHP installation and service 
companies, lack of knowledge among potential users, poor match with user preferences, 
and lobbying against pro-CHP policies by the coal and gas industries. Veen van der et al. 
[114] find that the main barrier to the diffusion of CHP in Denmark is a rule that prevents 
companies from selling CHP-generated electricity, and Wright et al. [115] use a case 
study in the United Kingdom to identify site-specific needs like capital structuring and 
contractual details, and non-site-specific needs like price uncertainty as the prominent 
barriers for diffusion of CHP. 
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3.1.1 Key Academic Questions 
The existing literature has understudied the non-financial barriers for CHP in the United 
States. For these non-financial barriers, they are unable to explain how the individual 
agency and opinion leadership (socio-political aspects) can affect the implementation 
decision and how different policies can address them. This essay addresses this gap in the 
literature by exploring the barriers that prevent financially viable CHP plants from being 
built. For these non-financial barriers, it investigates the following questions by using 
qualitative analysis (see Section 3.3 for details on methods). 
1. What kinds of non-financial obstacles were faced during the CHP implementation 
process? 
2. How can an individual agency; opinion leadership and larger policies affect the 
implementation decision to construct the CHP plant/facility? 
The rest of this essay is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents the background, 
Section 3.3 shows the methods, Section 3.5 presents the results and discusses them, 
Section 3.6 concludes and Section 3.7 presents the policy implications. Readers, who are 
familiar with the policy context of CHP in the United States, can directly skip to Section 
3.3 and continue after that. 
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3.2 Background  
The CHP policy context has gone through massive shifts: before the late 1970s, there 
were no U.S. federal or state policies encouraging CHP deployment but the 1978 Public 
Utilities Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), incentivized CHP by forcing utilities to buy 
electricity from cost-competitive independent generators. Many CHP power plants—
especially in the industrial sector—were cost-competitive and installed CHP capacity 
increased from 12GW in 1980 to 74 GW in 2004, (Figure 3-1). While CHP facilities can 
still benefit from a 10% investment tax credit, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 removed 
the requirement that utilities purchase electricity from CHP facilities and instead directed 
the Utilities to sell their power through competitive markets, and coupled with high 
natural gas prices (69% of US CHP plants) resulting in only 5.4GW of CHP installed 
from 2005-2015 [116].  
Currently, 66% of U.S. CHPs facilities have capacities greater than 100MW, and 80% 
(65.6GW) of CHP capacity is concentrated in the industrial sector (146 GW), especially 
petrochemicals and pulp and paper, as well as in the commercial area (76GW), district 
heating (11GW) and waste-to-energy (7GW). (See Figure 3-1) [116].  Policies that 
explicitly support and facilitate CHP installations are lacking at the federal level. 
However, some states have adopted policies to encourage CHP plant development (see 
Figure 3-2) through climate and energy plans. 
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Figure 3-1: Cumulative CHP installations 
In this figure, PURPA refers to Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act and EP Act refers to Energy Policy 
Act. The data for this figure were collected from US DOE CHP Installation Database [116]. 
For example, the Massachusetts Alternative Portfolio Standard (APS) requires retail 
electricity suppliers to acquire Alternative Energy Certificates (AEC) from qualifying 
technologies like CHP and the state Utility Energy Efficiency program provides 
incentives of up to $750/kW and 50% of feasibility cost for improving efficiency using 
technologies like CHP. 
CHP is a mature technology with promising future capabilities. The installed CHP 
capacity is only one-third of the 240GW of the technical potential estimated by the 
United States Department of Energy [105]. However, technological viability is different 
than economic viability.  Assuming companies can compare CHP with other alternatives 
if it has a payback of fewer than ten years, this time frame is considered for calculating 
economic viability. A report prepared for the Minnesota Department of Commerce [117] 
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finds that 33% of Minnesota’s technical CHP potential (~12.5GW) has a payback of 
fewer than ten years. Similarly, a different study estimates a lower total United States 
technical potential of 123 GW and predicts 33% of that has a payback of fewer than ten 
years [118]. This massive, unexploited potential for financially viable projects suggests 
that CHP faces significant non-financial barriers. This essay investigates those non-
financial barriers through multiple methods and expert elicitations.  
 
Figure 3-2: CHP installations (Watt) per capital and the policy count for each 50 states 
 
Installed 
capacity (Watt) 
per capita  
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The right-hand Y-axis shows the installed CHP capacity per capita in watts. It illustrates that more CHP 
policies do not necessarily translate into more CHP installations. Instead, the existing ones should rather be 
effective. Section 3.7 presents policy recommendations. The data for this figure were collected from US 
DOE CHP Installation Database [116] and CHP Policies and Incentives Database [119]. 
3.3 Key Policy Questions 
Considering the crippled market diffusion of a matured engineering technology that has 
immense future potential, this essay seeks answers to the following policy questions 
a) Do we need to evaluate the market diffusion of CHP from a socio-political 
context? Is the market stagnant only because of the financial barriers?  
b) What are the non-financial barriers, if any? How can they be alleviated? 
3.4 Methods 
This essay focuses on the barriers that prevent financially viable CHP plants from being 
built. It uses a combination of document analysis and semi-structured interviews to 
answer these questions. First, document analysis was conducted. Documents are a vital 
source of information [120]. They can be affected by regulatory and institutional settings 
surrounding them. For states like Minnesota, that are actively exploring options to 
increase the total GW of CHP installations, such documents can act as an active agent of 
interactions that are happening in the state. Therefore, the existing policies, that are 
relevant to CHP, throughout various states in the United States [119] were analyzed. 
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Figure 3-2 summarizes the CHP installations per capita and the different policies for all 
the 50 states and District of Columbia. The stacked bar chart, policy count, is the count of 
policies that are categorized for every state based on the colored legend given in this 
figure by the United States Environmental Protection Agency. After analyzing these 
policies, for states like Minnesota, working documents like from Minnesota Department 
of Commerce (MN-DOC) stakeholder process documents [121]were analyzed. Reports 
from MN-DOC stakeholder process illustrated the legitimate social means that were used 
in Minnesota to create and change policies to increase penetration of CHP. For each of 
these documents, three things a) author b) relevant policies and c) barriers/opportunities - 
if any were identified. The authors of these documents were the candidate interviewees8. 
Table 3-1: Expert Breakdown 
Affiliation Number of experts 
Independent developers (2) and users (9) 11 
Utilities 6 
Government agencies (regulatory, legislative) 9 
Advocates and consultants 6 
 
After document analysis, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 32 experts 
(Table 3-1 contains the categorical breakdown of the experts) who were working in 
various roles related to CHP. Interviews were conducted to get the first-hand account 
from the people who have lived through the process of installing CHPs and rejecting 
them. The meetings were either conducted in-person or by telephone. Each of these 
                                                 
8 Details pertaining to interview subjects and the recruitment process are described in appendix. 
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interviews lasted between 45-75 minutes. The interviews were transcribed, coded, 
reconciled and triangulated to obtain a final set of codes. From the final set of code, three 
themes, as described in results emerged. 
3.4.1 Interview Protocol 
The interviews were focused on the chronology of CHP project development and the 
dynamics of the social order around it. Experts were interviewed about individual CHP 
projects in which they had been involved, focusing on these areas: formulating the 
problem and understanding the policy, business, and organizational environment, 
integrating into this environment and evaluating the implementation (actual interview 
guide is attached in the supplementary information). Problem-formulation questions were 
asked to understand what problem the interviewee was trying to solve by building a CHP 
plant, why he or she chose CHP, and what other options he or she considered. The 
existing-system questions sought to understand the organizational structure and cultural 
characteristics that facilitated implementation. The integration questions focused on 
barriers when implementing a CHP project in the existing system as well as the factors 
that influenced designing the plan for that system. The post-implementation evaluation 
questions examined how successful a CHP project was. Besides, the interviewees were 
also asked open-ended questions about barriers to improving diffusion of CHP and 
questions about how they would facilitate or block a hypothetical CHP plant if they were 
a supporter or an adversary. 
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Table 3-2: Code and themes 
Theme number Final codes Codes from document analysis  
The business model of 
the utility 
Utility rate, energy regulation, 
environmental regulation, tariff, 
interconnection, net-metering, 
revenue-erosion 
Utility contracts, standby rates, utility 
business model 
Negative subjective 
impressions 
Not-alluring, education, training, 
knowledge, business priority, 
organization culture 
Education, lack of knowledge, 
organizational culture 
Allocation of risks and 
benefits 
Complicated, multiple, output, 
benefit sharing, price risk, hedge 
risk. 
 
 
3.4.2 Data Analysis 
The interviews were analyzed through qualitative coding and triangulation of themes. 
The interviews were segmented for each phase of the implementation process in 
implementation - understanding the problem and the existing system, actual 
implementation and post-implementation evaluation. Initially, 10-random transcripts 
were coded based on the codes from the document analysis. During this coding process, 
expert statements and broader themes were consistently triangulated to refine the codes. 
Therefore, after coding these ten interviews, some codes from the document analysis 
were dropped, others were reconciled, and yet other newer codes emerged. The codes 
from the first ten interviews were used to code another set of ten random interviews. This 
process was repeated until all the transcripts were coded and a final agreeable set of 
codes was obtained. Finally, these last codes were sorted into three themes (results). The 
codes from document analysis, the final agreeable-set of codes and the themes (results) 
are listed in Table 3-2. Intercoder agreement technique [122] was used to reconcile the 
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codes. It is particularly useful in this essay because one of the researchers (who 
conducted the interviews and transcribed them) is more knowledgeable on the subject 
matter than others. After several iterations of reconciliation, triangulation, and revision, 
the Intercoder agreement was over 97% (100 ∗ agreement/(agreement + disagreement)). 
3.5 Result and Discussion 
Three categories of non-financial barriers to CHP projects emerge from the data: a) the 
business model of the electrical utility b) negative subjective impressions and c) 
allocation of the risks and benefits. The following Section describes them in greater 
detail. Different groups of interviewees emphasize different barriers: utilities don’t 
consider their business model a barrier; government agencies don’t think that there are 
negative subjective impressions for CHP, and independent installers consider the 
allocation of risks and benefits to be less critical than others. Figure 3-3 illustrates these 
differences between the groups by plotting the frequency with which different categories 
of interviewees discuss each type of barriers. 
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Figure 3-3: Non-financial barriers broken down for each subclass of interviewees.  
The X-axis is the percentage of interviewees and Y-axis is their category. Everyone but the utilities 
consider the business model of the utility to be a significant barrier. 
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3.5.1 The Business Model of the Electricity Provider 
Many interviewees describe building CHP plants in the territory of investor-owned 
utilities (IOU), especially in electricity-only utilities, is difficult because of their business 
model. Over 70% of the independent developers, users, government agencies, advocates 
and consultants who were interviewed feel this was one of the most substantial non-
financial barriers, but only 33% of the utilities had such an impression. The regulatory 
system gives powerful incentives for utilities to increase electricity sales. With the 
present business model, their profits are proportional to the volume of electricity sold. 
Customer-owned CHP would reduce electricity sales and thus their profits. One 
interviewee explains that customer-owned CHP can look like “revenue erosion” to a 
utility, and another stated that a “utility has the strong reason to oppose the loss of 
electricity sales.”  One of the owners mentions that after a CHP project was announced, 
the utility “actually sent their president over to talk to [our president], encouraging him 
[not to do the project].” Another interviewee adds that unless we are successful in 
pivoting IOUs to “a different revenue model in which [they] become agnostic as to how 
much electricity they sell or how much natural gas they sell,” increasing the market 
penetration of CHP is difficult.  
In contrast, interviewees describe municipal and cooperative utilities as less opposed to 
CHP. Those types of utilities have a nonprofit business model and are focused more on 
selling energy at a reasonable cost, so they are less worried about revenue erosion and 
return on investment. For example, an interviewee from a municipal utility says “[selling] 
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energy at the most reasonable price possible [is our aim] and if CHP [helps to] drive 
those customer needs, [we`ll] be pursuing in that direction.” Municipal and cooperative 
utilities can also be more flexible and make decisions more quickly than IOUs because 
they are governed more directly by their customers and do not require approval from the 
regulators.  
IOUs hamper customer-owned CHP by imposing technical requirements like 
interconnection standards and financial barriers like high standby rates. One developer 
said, “we were watching [the utility] pretty carefully to see what it [was] up to because 
they could suddenly drive [to] increase the standby charges so badly that this project 
would [be stalled].” As customer-owned CHP is “revenue erosion” for the utilities, they 
sometimes oppose already-operating projects. For example, the owner of a biomass-
fueled plant says, “We have 4 years left on our PPA [Power Purchase Agreement]. [If] 
they don't tend to purchase biomass produced electricity as before, that would impact on 
our finances.” 
IOUs generally do not build their CHP plants because they are a complicated solution for 
providing power (as CHP typically operate to generate heat first and electricity second). 
A CHP generator is typically smaller than a conventional generator, and it straddles 
different policy boxes because separate regulations and incentive programs cover them 
differently. Instead, utilities prefer to build a sizeable thermal generator that benefits from 
economies of scale and has only an electricity customer or a renewable generator that 
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benefit from government incentives. IOUs also face the risk that the Public Utilities 
Commission (PUC) might not approve their cost recovery.   
If IOUs oppose CHP development, how do CHP plants get built at all? In general, either 
the PUC that regulates the IOU is pro-CHP or the customer building the CHP plant is a 
high-value customer to the utility. One interviewee compares IOU's and PUC's 
relationship as that of a sunflower and the sun. He says, “Sunflowers will track the sun 
across the sky. Utilities will find and track what their regulators want and will follow 
them.” For example, utilities in states where the PUC supports a CHP (e.g., biomass) are 
much more likely to build these projects. In Minnesota, 24MW of biomass-based CHP 
was installed from 2009-2014 because, as a regulator from Minnesota explained, 
“[statue] directs us that we approve [biomass-based CHPs] regardless of prices.” Another 
interviewee, when asked about how their CHP was financed, says, “We are a regulated 
utility. So, the cost that it takes for us to provide service to our customers [is] covered 
under the [rate structures that] our [stateX] regulators set.”  Large or high-value electrical 
customers can often persuade the utility to accept a CHP project. An interviewee said, 
“The only reason that a utility wants a CHP unit is that the customer is [significant] to the 
utility and they want the customer to be happy.” He further adds an example, “[Customer 
X] is largest [regarding] total load that they serve. [This customer] wanted to build a co-
generation facility.” Because this customer was “such a large and important customer,” 
the utility worked with them to overcome the barriers. 
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3.5.2 Negative Subjective Impressions Based on Anecdotal Evidence 
Personal, psychological and contextual factors combine to shape decision-makers' 
opinion of CHP. Many current CHP plant owners and operators describe having negative 
impressions of CHP before they evaluated it for their facility, like one who had the 
impression that installing CHP was "a never-ending process." Most of our non-
governmental interviewees (over 60% of them) describe negative subjective impressions 
as a major impediment. Many decision-makers' negative perceptions seem to stem from 
their lack of knowledge and experience. An interviewee from the malting industry 
describes struggling in “trying to pull other [knowledgeable] people” to help them fill the 
knowledge gap before and during the initial stages of their CHP installation. Negative 
perceptions are most common in industries where CHP plants are uncommon. 
Opportunities to install a CHP plant are rare; they usually come when a heating system 
needs to be upgraded or replaced, which happens only once every few decades. 
Therefore, prospective owners/operators must rely on anecdotal evidence from others.   
Their attitudes towards competing technologies also shape Decision-makers’ attitudes 
towards CHP. A CHP plant owner describes it as not being “as alluring technology [like] 
solar and wind,” and another says “It is not a flashy, sexy thing. It is not solar. It is not 
wind.” A third owner admits CHP is “frankly [p]retty boring.”    
When CHP (or energy) is not part of their core business, they are afraid that CHP would 
be too big of a distraction [123] for them to handle. For example, an interviewee explains 
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that allocating money to install a CHP plant must compete with “research, teaching, and 
outreach. And, so if academic health department comes along and says that we must put 
up a brand-new hospital, our CFO will say wait a minute, I have a bulk of money here. 
Am I going to build a CHP or am I going to build a hospital?” 
An opinion leader who advocates for CHP can help overcome initial negative perceptions 
of the decision-maker.  A CHP user says, “Somebody has to champion these things. 
Somebody has got to say. This is what we are going to do.” An opinion leader can align 
CHP with their other organizational goals. Opinion leaders have a variety of motivations. 
One interviewee explains “We decided to put the CHP because it [would] be able to 
eliminate our boiler system; [it] serves the entire plant’s need.”  Another interviewee 
adds, “I knew that putting in a package boiler just to make steam was not a very smart 
thing to do from [the] sustainability point of view, from a cost point of view, etc.” 
Another developer decided to install a CHP plant, despite a payback period of 20 years, 
because their institution wanted to achieve “zero carbon by 2050.”  Similarly, for another 
facility, “the efficiency of the arrangement” and “the waste reduction” was the prominent 
driver. They do not look for the immediate return on investments but value their broader 
organizational goals (e.g., going green or minimizing waste).  
Many interviewees, except those from government agencies, believe these negative 
subjective impressions are a significant barrier. One independent developer explained 
that working together with the client and educating them is a significant aspect for 
cashing this rare window of opportunity. Another user explains “education is the main 
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tool” when the decision makers “do not understand [and] know [what] co-generation is.”  
Another consultant explained how he envisions of having “CEO only” meetings to create 
positive impressions of CHP among the opinion leaders. Another developer explained 
that they often find that “the boundaries of the projects are very limiting, [so they] talk 
about what's on edge, what is beyond the bounds” and convince the decision makes to 
consider CHP. 
3.5.3 The Risks and Benefits of Multiple Cost and Revenue Steams 
Allocating “who pays and where do the benefits accrue” can be a major barrier to CHP 
projects with separate customers for the heat and electrical outputs.  Most non-
government interviewees (over 60% of them) think this is an important barrier, but it is 
mentioned less than the other two barriers described above. One interviewee said the   
“holy grail of CHP is some kind of deal structure that captures all the value streams and 
returns them to the parties that are bearing the risk.”  Those deal structures and business 
agreements are complicated. First, a project is exposed to both electricity price and fuel 
price risks. Second, some of the benefits accrue to both the electricity and heat customers, 
while other benefits are mutually exclusive, i.e., one customer loses when the other 
benefits. Third, owners and investors face ‘off-take’ risks, i.e., the likelihood that the 
customer for electricity or heat will shut down or otherwise exit the agreement. 
A CHP project faces both fuel- and electricity-price risks. An interviewee from a state 
energy office says, “The more substantial risk is the risk on the commodity side of the 
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natural gas [and] electricity.” Most CHP plants are fueled by natural gas, which in the 
U.S. has historically more volatile prices than other fossil fuels.  An owner/operator says, 
“Most of our risk and uncertainty is just based on natural gas prices. [...] We have been 
hedging that risk well with natural gas future purchasing positions. [...] It [provides] 
stable prices for our thermal BTUs.” Some plants are designed to switch between fuel 
sources, such as natural and oil, depending on their relative price. For example, it is 
common for dual-fuel CHP plants to have “an interruptible gas contract” that allows 
supply to be cut off during peak demand times in exchange for a lower price the rest of 
the time. Several interviewees discussed biomass-fueled plants, but none described 
burning biomass to reduce fuel price risk. 
The interdependence between the outputs of a CHP plant makes it more difficult to 
allocate fuel price and electricity price risks than a typical power plant or heating project 
that only provides one output. Comparatively lower percent of the interviewees (27% for 
independent developers to 67% for utilities) talked about the complications for CHP that 
arise due to interdependent outputs. For example, many CHP plants are operated to 
follow the heat load, which means that they may not be able to take advantage of high 
electricity prices or avoid low electricity prices. The same allocation problem also applies 
to other revenue sources. For example, the electricity produced by a CHP plant that burns 
biomass may receive renewable credits, but the heat generated does not. An interviewee 
says, “I have been beating the drums for a couple of years that if thermal energy is valued 
the same as electrical energy - from a renewable source - I think there should be a level 
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playing field and the investment dollars will follow the best technology and best 
efficiency.” At least one state addresses this problem with an Alternative Portfolio 
Standard that “specifically supports CHP and it provides a credit, an electronic certificate, 
for each MW [electric generation and useful thermal load] of CHP generation.” 
Availability of such benefits has a direct impact on their finances. For example, an 
interviewee explains, “[The utilities] get some revenue by selling the APS credits, which 
is a meaningful amount.”  For example, a 1.8 MWe CHP plant with absorption chiller in 
Massachusetts could receive almost $600,000 per year from Alternative Energy Credits 
(AECs) [124]. At places where such credits don’t exist, the developers and operators 
must rely on the Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs). An operator explains, “We have 
four years left on our [Power Purchase Agreement] for [a] renewable energy purchase 
agreement with the utility. [If] they don't tend to purchase biomass produced electricity in 
the same extent than that would impact on our finances.”  
In addition to fuel and electricity price risks, plants with separate heat and electricity 
customers face ‘off-take’ risk, i.e., the risk that the customer for electricity or heat will 
shut down or otherwise exit the agreement. If this happens, the remaining partner could 
lose money or service. An environmental advocate says building a CHP plant is “like 
getting married. If they're putting in with this company, they have to feel pretty sure that 
this company is going to stay there.” Large companies are particularly averse to being 
locked into a long-term relationship. An interviewee explains, “one of the big barriers for 
these [...] potentially multinational companies that have a lot of little operations all over 
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the place [is that] they're not going to invest in capital costs and operation if they're not 
certain about how long it's going to be around.” A utility writes “many potential projects 
have not been implemented, due to the risk of stranded assets if the host customers were 
to go out of business or experience a significant reduction in operational demand [125].” 
Much of the existing CHP capacity in the U.S. (over 60%) does not face this barrier 
because it is installed at industrial facilities that use both the heat and electricity outputs, 
such as petroleum refining, chemical manufacturing, and pulp-paper manufacturing. 
However, there is little opportunity for growth of CHP in those industries; so many new 
CHP systems will be installed in facilities that do not consume the entire heat and power 
outputs. One interviewee suggests doing smaller projects to reduce the risk or building 
movable CHP plants. She speculates about a movable project– “instead of going full in 
on the marriage, doing a smaller project that you could move, like a boiler or system that, 
if that energy user was gone, you could pick it up and put it somewhere else. That is 
probably less efficient, but that reduces some of that risk if that energy user’s going to 
remain.” Therefore, unless the “holy grail” of properly valuing and allocating risks and 
benefits is sorted out, the diffusion of financially viable CHP will remain stagnant. 
 
3.5.4 Discussion 
With changing energy system landscape, future of the energy system is shifting towards 
energy efficiency, resiliency, and flexibility. The United States is no different. Producing 
electricity and useful heat at the same time using CHP can help in achieving resiliency 
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and flexibility services with huge efficiency improvements. However, despite a 
substantial unexploited potential (110-150 GW) [106], the United States generates less 
power and heat from CHP plants than other parts of the world (see Section 3.2). While 
the financial barriers like spark-spread, need for substantial capital investment, and long-
term return on investment is necessary, many financially viable CHP projects in the 
United States are blocked by non-financial barriers. This essay finds the business model 
of electric utilities, especially IOUs, to be a barrier to market diffusion of CHP. The 
majority of the non-utility experts (over 70% of them) believe utilities impose fees, rate 
structures, and technical requirements to make distributed generation financially 
unattractive. This finding is consistent with the findings of other studies of CHP adoption 
[126] and innovation in the electric power industry [127]. It is also consistent with an 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) survey of 41 United States utility companies, 
which finds only two electric-only IOUs that provide support for CHP that is not state-
mandated, compared to ten public utilities and six gas related IOUs [128]. However, this 
and previous studies do not objectively examine the requirements utilities impose on 
CHP projects to conditions imposed on other types of projects because the terms of the 
contracts are confidential. The interviewees describe for-profit IOUs as more opposed to 
CHP than nonprofit (i.e., municipal and cooperative) utilities. A statistical analysis of a 
larger sample of projects could quantitatively test the effect of utility business models on 
CHP adoption. Finally, some interviewees describe some IOUs as being less opposed to 
CHP than others. Future research could interview utility decision-makers further to try to 
understand the source of this heterogeneity. Over 60% of the non-governmental 
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interviewees talk about negative subjective impressions as a barrier to CHP. Decision-
makers’ personal opinions (subjective impressions) based on anecdotal evidence are a 
barrier to many other technologies that are rare and don’t have supportive policies. In this 
situation, business decisions must be made, without adequately analyzing risks and 
opportunities, by making trade-offs based on anecdotes. Previous research shows that 
both peer networks and change agents influence the diffusion of innovations[129]. Future 
research could test the peer network effect on CHP diffusion by more closely examining 
industries with significantly different penetrations of CHP and test the “change agent" 
effect by interviewing additional people within each company to better understand the 
internal decision-making process. Although fewer interviewees (27% developers/users to 
67% utilities) identify the allocation of revenue and cost streams as a major barrier than 
the other two described above, I anticipate it will become more important as the 
variability of electricity prices increases. Grid operators need "flexible" generators that 
can rapidly adjust their output to balance variable wind and solar power, but these 
requirements limit CHP to meet their heating demand. Some CHP plants in countries 
with high penetration of renewables, such as Germany, Denmark, and Sweden[130], are 
increasing their flexibility by installing thermal storage [131] to reduce the coupling 
between heat and power output. The cost of such a technical solution must still be 
allocated between the heat and electricity customers, though that may be less complicated 
than a contract that compensates the heating customer for unmet heating demand.  
Lessons can be learnt from the use of Alternative Energy Certificates. These certificates 
value both renewable heat and electricity equally. AECs are needed for IOUs to meet 
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their portfolio standards. In Massachusetts one AEC is equal to 3.4 MMBTU or 1 MWh 
[132].  So, the IOUs can buy these certificates instead of developing their renewable 
projects.  Therefore, the concept of AEC can be extended to include resiliency and 
flexibility services. Further, research is required in developing methods to conduct a 
thorough assessment, extend the concepts of AECs, and allocate capital costs that value 
the benefits like resiliency and flexibility services from CHP.   
3.6 Conclusion 
CHP is a mature technology that already plays a critical role in the energy systems of 
many countries. It is well known for improving energy efficiency, and its newest fleet can 
provide “flexibility services” to increase renewable penetration. In the United States, 
CHP remains an under-exploited technology and many projects with payback periods of 
less than ten years have not been built. This essay assessed the non-financial barriers to 
CHP in the United States through interviews with energy experts and found that financial 
viability is a necessary but not enough condition for developing a CHP project. The most 
critical non-financial barriers are a) the business model of the electrical utility b) negative 
subjective impressions based on anecdotal evidence and c) allocating the risks and 
benefits of many costs and revenue streams. Overcoming these barriers would help to 
exploit CHP potential, improve energy efficiency, and, in the case of the newest CHP 
systems, provide flexibility services to the grid. To overcome these barriers, clear policies 
are necessary. 
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3.7 Policy Implications 
This essay seeks answers to the policy questions as described in section 3.3 considering 
the existing government policies with recommended improvements. As shown in Figure 
3-2, every state in the United States has some policies related to CHP. Generous financial 
incentives could make CHP projects profitable enough to overcome the non-financial 
barriers that are identified in this essay. However, the International Energy Agency finds, 
“The evidence from many countries is clear. CHP does not need substantial financial 
incentives to make it happen. Rather, it requires the effective use of often modest, 
targeted policies to systematically address barriers and allow for full realization of the 
potential” [133]. The PURPA law in the United States is a targeted, non-financial policy 
that addresses the utility business model barrier by forcing utilities to accept cost-
competitive power from CHP plants. That law was largely responsible for increasing the 
penetration of CHP from 12GW in 1980 to 74 GW in 2004 (see Section 3.2).  
Another example is the United States federal CHP Technical Assistance Partnerships 
(CHP-TAPs), which address the lack of knowledge by providing information and 
technical assistance to energy end-users and policymakers. I recommend the CHP-TAPs 
should go beyond identifying market opportunities for CHP by directly contacting 
potential users well suited to CHP. I also recommend expanding forums and workshops 
for CHP operators to share experiences and lessons learned with each other and with 
prospective operators. These policies can be supplemented with policies that address the 
electric utility business models (especially rate-related) barrier like the standby rate 
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waiver for distributed generation in Connecticut or optional standby rates in Hawaii.  
CHP plants have efficiency and emissions advantage over fossil-fuel-burning heating and 
power plants, but it can be difficult for them to take advantage from policies that focus 
individually on electricity or heat. To address the barrier of multiple outputs and revenue 
streams, policies that encourage energy efficiency or restrict pollution (especially 
greenhouse gasses) should either encourage CHP explicitly or take a holistic view of all 
types of energy consumed by a building or collection of buildings. For example, industry 
performance standards in Massachusetts give CHP owners credits for "avoided 
emissions.” Texas Utility Code that allows CHP facilities to sell electricity and heat to 
any customer. Proper allocation of risks and benefits is crucial for CHP implementation. 
Each CHP project and its financing are unique. Whether a project is self-financed or 
financed through an external lender/investor, funding for CHP project largely depends on 
the capital available from its host or owner and their creditworthiness. As CHP projects 
generally involve multiple partners, availability of such capital depends on the proper 
allocation of risks and benefits among them (i.e., the partners need to decide on who gets 
what and who invests what). CHP projects must first navigate through an intricate 
landscape of streamlining allocation of risks and benefits and then look for project 
financing options. CHP projects are likely to be financed, with reasonable terms, if the 
developers come with a detailed plan (where risks and benefits are appropriately 
allocated) and build a strong relationship with their lenders.  
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CHP is a proven engineering concept that utilizes waste heat to get substantial efficiency 
gains (see section 3.1). It has been in existence for over a century and is widely used for 
reducing GHG and increasing energy efficiency. The newest plants can provide 
“flexibility services” to help manage the intermittency of renewable generators. However, 
without adopting the measures described above, the market diffusion of CHP in the 
United States shall remain stagnant, and the projects will not be able to secure financing.  
3.8 Limitations and Further Research 
This research took years to complete, and the methods were rigorous. However, there are 
a few avenues and biases that can be further explored. Some of these, being more 
relevant to the discussion of the results, are described in the last paragraph of section 3.5 
whereas others are mentioned here. For example, this research is based on the subjective 
perceptions of the interviewees. Opinions are important because they influence decision-
making, but it is hard to know whether those perceptions are accurate independently. For 
example, advocates perceive that IOUs impose onerous conditions to block CHP projects, 
but I do not assess whether the requirements they impose are the unreasonable or 
unusual.  Therefore, an interesting topic would be to explore the detailed barriers 
imposed just by the IOUs by questioning their intentions and motivations.  Another 
limitation of this research is that none of the interviewees was a decision-maker who did 
not install CHP. The essay includes early impressions of people who eventually installed 
a CHP system, and that's interesting and important. However, it does not necessarily tell 
if the people who haven't invested in CHP think the same way. Therefore, research 
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focusing on decision makers who did not install CHP would be an interesting avenue. 
Finally, quantitative analysis to either support or criticize my findings would also help to 
take this quest into another level. 
3.9 My Contributions 
The work presented in this essay is a part of a collaborative effort with Prof Elizabeth J. 
Wilson (Dartmouth College) and Dr. Stephen Rose (Mid Continent ISO). My 
contributions are concept creation, scheduling and conducting interviews, transcribing 
and coding them, inferring results, writing and presenting the findings. Prof. Elizabeth J.  
Wilson was responsible for editorial guidance. Dr. Stephen Rose was responsible for 
theme creation, triangulation, and editorial support. This content of this chapter is 
published in The Electricity Journal, Elsevier [134] DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2019.02.011 
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4. DISPATCHING EVS AS MICRO -GENERATORS OF A 
VIRTUAL POWER PLANT IN A WHOLESALE 
ELECTRICITY MARKET 
4.1 Introduction 
Countries around the world are encouraging reductions in greenhouse gas emissions with 
strategies such as decreasing dependency on fossil fuel, improving energy efficiency, and 
switching to renewable and nuclear generators [135].  Electric Vehicles (EVs), both fully 
electric and their hybrid counterparts (Plug-in Hybrid EVs) are energy efficient and are 
thus responsible for direct reductions in greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions relative to 
emissions from conventional vehicles.  Nealer et. al [136] finds that, with a clean grid 
mix, cradle-to-grave9 GHG for EVs are ~50% lower than for conventional vehicles. 
Clean-grid-mix is important here. One of the ways to achieve a clean grid is by carefully 
implementing a carbon tax[101]; otherwise there may not be sufficient emission 
reduction. For example, Babcan et al. [137]find that decentralized residential energy 
storages could only reduce emissions if it is coupled with carbon-related tariff reforms 
that precede it.   
EVs also have the potential for indirect benefits by improving the operation of power 
systems that rely on renewable energy sources.  Increasing renewable penetration can 
                                                 
9 Cradle-to-grave emissions include all the emissions that occur during manufacturing, transportation, actual operation and end-of-
life. 
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cause intermittency issues like uncertainty in power generation, lack of capacity reserves 
and reduction in ramping capabilities. If connected to the grid, EVs could compensate for 
renewable intermittency, reduce feeder losses through volt/VAR optimization, and 
improve load factor and load variance. For example, Kempton et al. [138] find that 
Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) systems can be used to provide both backup and storage for 
compensating for renewable intermittency. Manbachi et al. [139] introduce smart-meter 
based optimization for EVs that minimizes distribution system losses by using volt/VAR 
control techniques. Similarly, Sortomme et. al  [140] argues that EVs could be used to 
minimize load variance and thus minimize the feeder losses. Some argue that EVs could 
facilitate the development of power systems that are not reliant on fossil fuels [141] and 
decreasing renewable curtailments  [142; 143].  
Further, as EVs are parked for most of their lifetimes, with advances in power electronics 
and time-dependent control [144], EVs can also help in reducing renewable curtailments. 
For example, wind generally peaks at night when the load is at a minimum and is 
therefore often curtailed. Parked EVs can be used to consume extra electricity generated 
by wind, store it, and return it to the grid when it is needed during the day. The effect on 
curtailment can be substantial: in one study based in Hawaii10, it was demonstrated that 
EVs could reduce wind and solar curtailment by 30-47% (220GWh to 346GWh) [145].   
It should be noted that there are many energy storage system ideas, most of which have 
the potential for improving power system reliability. Paine et al.[146], For example, 
                                                 
10 This is the one study of its kind. The amount of curtailment may not be realized in locations that are less sunny or less windy 
than Hawaii. 
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studies how market rules affect the profitability of pumped hydroelectric storage 
facilities.  One significant advantage of EVs relative to these other storage options is their 
ubiquity. 
The number of EVs has significantly grown in the past decade. For example, according to 
the International Energy Agency [147], globally, the number of EVs has increased from 
1.67k in 2005 to 1257k in 2015. This increase has been facilitated by a mixture of 
technology-push and demand-pull policies that are targeted at global, national and 
regional levels (see Section 4.5) However, irrespective of these numbers, all the benefits 
from these EVs have not yet been fully realized.  A key to realizing all these benefits is 
an actively functioning V2G system [148]. In a V2G system, the EVs can both charge 
and discharge, as needed, and also provide grid services like frequency regulation, phase 
regulation, and voltage balance without impairing driving patterns [149]. For example, 
Wang et. al [150] find that EVs can provide grid services in a decentralized V2G system, 
confer significant cost savings and still allow for sufficient battery energy levels for 
driving.  
The concept of V2G was first introduced in the late 1990s [151]. Since then, engineers 
have focused on technical factors like improving optimization, controlling V2G operation 
or improving battery life [152]. For example, Ansari et. al [153]propose an optimal 
bidding strategy of coordinated ancillary services (regulation and spinning reserve). 
While the technical side of integrating EVs into V2G systems is highly important, 
economic aspects cannot be neglected. Economic feasibility is key to the adoption of EVs 
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in the marketplace [154]. Most of such work on the economics and finance of EVs finds 
V2G to be profitable11. For example, Kempton et. al [155] find that V2G systems are 
profitable for providing peak demand, spinning reserve, and regulation services. Pelzer 
et. al  [156], using a price responsive approach, find that V2G systems are profitable in 
Singapore. Guo et. al [157], using an optimal charging scenario, also finds V2G systems 
to be useful.  
However, despite such claims, in the past two decades, most V2G projects have not 
moved beyond the pilot phase. It is likely that one barrier to commercial viability is that, 
despite the findings in the literature, V2G systems would not be profitable to all 
participants given current market conditions and rules. For example, Peterson et. al [158] 
find V2G systems are not profitable to the EVs, mostly because of battery costs.  
4.1.1 Key Academic Questions 
The goal of this essay is to examine the economics of a V2G system and to assess the 
impact of alternative sets of market rules governing compensation for electricity 
products.  Estimation of rewards depends on the revenue system and battery costs, both 
of which are dependent on market rules and policies.  
This essay builds a detailed model for a centralized V2G system in which a single entity 
(like a Virtual Power Plant (VPP)) schedules the EVs to minimize its total generation 
cost. This essay builds on prior work on EVs and V2G systems in several ways. First, this 
                                                 
11 This refers to share of profit that is a result of a market transaction and not how the perception of this profit might influence the 
demand for EVs. 
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research captures more of the real market features by using actual market prices and rules 
from the Electricity Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) that is an Independent System 
Operator (ISO). It uses the battery and EV price data from EV manufacturers. Data on 
Nissan vehicles were acquired from Nissan’s website [159]. Data on Tesla were acquired 
from Tesla’s website [160]. It also uses data on subsidies from both federal and state 
repositories. Data on federal incentives were acquired from [161]. Data on state subsidies 
were acquired from the Legislature of the State of Texas [162]. Second, it assumes that 
aggregated-EVs can offer both ancillary services (as a capacity resource) and energy. 
Third, building on [163], it formulates a Dynamic Programming-Unit Commitment (DP-
UC) bi-layer algorithm to capture the tiered decision-making that would occur in a V2G: 
the first stage evaluates the reward for each of the possible control actions 
(charge/discharge/idle) using DP, and the second stage dispatches the least-cost EVs from 
the set of all the available EVs using a UC.  
Three pricing scenarios are modeled. In all the scenarios, the VPP is the wholesale 
electricity market participant, i.e., it receives a nodal price signal ($/MWhr) from the 
market and dispatches the available EVs to deliver electricity. Since the VPP is only 
transacting very small amount of energy - around 1MW [164] at a given point of time - it 
cannot influence the prices in the wholesale market. Therefore, it is an infra-marginal 
generator and thus a price taker.  Table 4-2 lists ERCOT's generating capacity and peak 
demand. According to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) [165], 
ERCOT's summer generating capacity is 75GW with a peak demand of 69GW (in 2015) 
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and has 46.5K miles of transmission lines. Its average energy price for 2015 is 
24.70$/MWh and average regulation price for the same year is 7.8$/MWh  [166]. The 
VPP cannot influence prices in the wholesale electricity market. It owns the parking lot 
and the Battery Energy Storage System (a control system) that sends the actual control 
signals to the EVs (see Figure 4-1 for a typical V2G setup). The EVs choose whether to 
participate in the provision of grid services (see Section 4.2 for details). Further, a typical 
centralized V2G require a collection of complete information from each EV, control 
power demand, price from the grid-operator and heavy bi-directional communication. 
Since the purpose of the model is to learn whether a V2G system would be profitable for 
EVs under alternative assumptions about how EVs are compensated, it is assumed that all 
these barriers for a centralized V2G system are overcome and that it is functional. 
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Table 4-1: Scenario description. 
 
Scenario Description 
Business as Usual (BAU) The EVs charge (but do not discharge) at the VPP’s premises, at a 
fixed retail price.   
Fixed retail price The VPP transacts with the market or system operator using the 
wholesale market price and EVs charge and discharge at a fixed 
retail price.  
Dynamic retail price EVs charge/discharge at a dynamic retail price, which means that 
the retail price changes with time to reflect the changes in the 
wholesale electricity market. 
Wholesale price with 50% 
profit sharing 
The VPP transacts with the system operator at the wholesale price 
and shares 50% of its total reward from the wholesale market with 
the participating EVs. 
 
I use ERCOT data and market rules. Therefore, the results apply to markets like ERCOT: 
those with a centralized V2G system that both a) use nodal energy and ancillary service 
prices and b) have prices like those in ERCOT. Table 4-2, lists some of the comparable 
system operators and their attributes (see Section 4.4.4 for details on market trends for 
ERCOT). 
Table 4-2: Comparing electricity markets in the United States. 
ERCOT, the case study in this paper, manages the electricity market in Texas 
 
 LMP  
($/MWh) 
Regulation 
Prices 
($/MWh) 
Generating 
Capacity 
(GW) 
Peak Demand 
(GW) 
Annual 
Billing 
(Billion $) 
ERCOT 24.70 10.25 (up) 
5.35(down) 
75 69 34 
California ISO 31.01 5.66 (up) 
3.13 (down) 
60 50 11 
Mid Continent 
ISO 
25.05 7.49 174 118 25 
 
 
Section 4.2 describes the methods, Section 4.5 shows the results and discusses the 
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findings, and Section 4.6 presents the conclusion. The main conclusion of this essay is 
that V2G could be profitable to all the participants with reduced battery costs and well-
designed market rules. V2G systems could thus become sustainable (i.e., EVs join and 
remain) in the long-term. Such insights are useful for decision makers who are concerned 
about developing newer market products, investing in Research and Development and 
weighing policy alternatives. 
4.2 Background 
V2G is a concept where EVs can both charge and discharge, as needed, and also provide 
grid services like frequency regulation, phase regulation, and voltage balance to the 
market or system operator, without impairing driving patterns [149].  EVs, aggregators 
and market operators are critical players in any V2G system.  
Market Operator / System Operator
                      
Aggeragator/VPP
Web Service(ESB/ Https)SCADA/Comms
Commands out
Prices
Bids
Status in
 
Figure 4-1:  Typical V2G setup 
In this setup, typically the Market Operator communicates with the Aggregator using web services and 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)/communication channels. SCADA and 
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communication channels are used to send signals like set points and receiving statuses, whereas web 
services (like Enterprise Service Bus (ESB)) are used to send and receive price signals as XML payloads.  
 
This essay uses a centralized architecture based V2G. In a centralized architecture [140; 
167], the control decision and data exchanges are based on the aggregator’s central 
computers; whereas, in a decentralized architecture [142; 168], the control decisions and 
data exchanges are both distributed.  In a centralized architecture, VPP transacts with 
both EVs and the system operator.  Generally, a VPP can partner with a local parking 
owner and act as an aggregator. The centralized architecture may a) require redundant 
systems to provide backup during failures b) be computationally intense and c) may value 
itself over the EV owners. However, it better utilizes network capacity, and optimization 
problem is more straightforward and more practical.  Therefore, it is chosen as a V2G 
architecture for this essay.  
 
4.3 Key Policy Questions 
Since the 1990s, the concept of V2G is burgeoning among academics. There have also 
been a few pilot projects. However, in practice, this concept shows no signs of 
commercial takeoff. Therefore, this essay seeks to answer the following key policy 
questions 
• Do we need to thoroughly evaluate the V2G concept/policy in the context of the 
present market rules? 
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• Are the market rules/rewards enough to compensate EV owners for V2G 
services? How can they be improved? 
 
4.4 Methods 
In the model, the VPP receives data from both EVs and the system operator and, for each 
period, evaluates the best rewards from the set of available rewards for performing three 
different control actions (charge, discharge and idle). Upon entry into the VPP (that owns 
the parking lot and Battery Storage System), EV owners indicate their willingness to 
participate, their minimum State of Charge (SOCmin) and their cost/battery parameters. 
Availability and willingness flags indicate the presence of EVs in the parking lot and 
their willingness to participate in the market for the next 15 minutes12. Since the real-time 
elasticity of electricity supply/demand is small, it is assumed that the EV's willingness to 
participate remains unaffected by the market price (except in sensitivity case 3 - see 
Section 4.5.3). If they are unavailable or unwilling, they will not be considered for market 
participation. Based on this information, the VPP bids capacity and energy into the 
ERCOT market. For simplicity, it is assumed that the bids are always accepted without 
any changes. The bids offered by the market participant and actual schedules dispatched 
orders from the market can be slightly different. 
 SOCmin represents the minimum SOC that each EV wants to have by the time it exits the 
                                                 
12 The time increment is 15 minutes.  As an example, consider the present time to be 13:00 PM. At 12:45 PM, 15-minutes prior to 
dispatch, the VPP has obtained all the necessary flags from the EVs. This 15-minute window also provides enough cushions to cover 
for delays that can happen during the flow of information to and from the VPP. 
       
 
88 
VPP. 100% SOC corresponds to the rated load capacity of the EV (please see Section 
4.4.5). Similarly, VPP’s load capacity is the sum of load capacities of the available and 
willing EVs (~1MW). The VPP guarantees this SOC unless the EVs leave the premises 
before reaching this level. To illustrate, suppose EV1 wants to achieve 60% SOC and 
EV2 wants to achieve 20% SOC by the time they exit the VPP's premises. Assume the 
initial SOC of EV1 is 20% and EV2 is 10%. EV2 stays within the VPP for 5 hours and 
EV1 stays there only for 15 minutes. Assume that the VPP can only increase SOC by at 
most 15% every 15 minutes. When both EVs enter the VPP, they will immediately be 
considered for charging during the next dispatch (next 15 minutes). However, since EV1 
leaves immediately after the next dispatch, its SOC will only be 35%. However, since 
EV2 stays there for 5 hours, it will participate in the market after charging and will also 
ensure that it’s SOC=SOCmin. 
The VPP will first charge any EV with SOC< SOCmin and will not consider this EV for 
providing energy or ancillary services. Along with their preferences, EV owners also 
submit cost functions, and these are linear in the charge and discharge space as described 
below.  This approach is like that employed by other market participants (e.g., steam 
power plants use heat rate curves) to derive and submit their cost functions to the market 
operator. Analogously, it is assumed that the EV owners come up with their cost 
functions based on information at their disposal as described in Section 4.4.5 and submit 
them to the VPP. 
Unlike EVs’ preferences, the system operator’s preferences are in the form of market 
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signals like Real Time-Locational Marginal Prices (RT-LMPs) and Real Time-
Regulating Reserve Prices (RT-RRPs). RT-LMPs are paid to market participants for 
providing energy and RT-RRPs are paid for providing reserve services.  
 
Figure 4-2:  Simulation Method – EVs in a wholesale electricity market 
 
To decide on the control action, the VPP runs a two-level optimization as shown in Figure 
4-2. In the first level, it performs dynamic programming (Section 4.4.1and in the second 
level, it performs unit commitment (Section 4.4.2).  
The DP layer gives a desired MW value to the UC layer. The UC layer then solves for the 
least-cost dispatch order with respect to this MW value. The DP problem is solved using 
forward search as in Paine et al. [146] and UC is solved using Lagrange relaxation as 
described by Wood et al.  [169]. Forward search is used, instead of a backward recursive 
search, because the starting point and the future objective are known for the DP problem. 
Lagrange relaxation is used, instead of Mixed Integer Programming, because is easy to 
• Get price data
• Get EV parameters
• Get grid parameters
Get input
• Run dynamic 
programming
• Run unit 
commitment
Optimize
Choices • Calculate profit for 
the VPP
• Calculate profit for 
EVs
Profit 
Calculation
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implement and is well proven to work with scheduling problems. For each 15-minute 
interval, the VPP decides on the control action (discharge, charge, idle) to maximize its 
returns and sends corresponding binding signals to the EVs. The solution to the DP-UC 
problem is computationally intensive. For a laptop computer with Intel-I3-4030 at 
1.9GHZ, it took 44.21 hours to solve a scenario for one year. Note: This is the time taken 
after selecting representative hours - as described in Section 4.4.3 and threading the 
program into the available 2-cores. 
4.4.1 Dynamic Programming 
Dynamic programming provides a way to solve for the optimal control action necessary 
to maximize a VPP’s present value. The VPP sells energy and ancillary services 
(capacity) on the wholesale market. I assume that this VPP is an inframarginal generator 
and thus a price taker in this market.  
Given states 𝑆𝑡and time 𝑡1, the VPP seeks to maximize the sum of its current and future 
rewards. The VPP observes 𝑆𝑡and takes the control action 𝑥𝑡to maximize its total reward. 
The state variable vector 𝑆𝑡 includes both the capacity of the VPP and market prices. The 
control variable𝑥𝑡 represents discharge, charge or idle mode 𝑥𝑡= (1, 2, 3). If the EVs are 
unavailable or unwilling or if SOC<SOCmin, they will not be considered for market 
participation and will only be charged until SOC=SOCmin. Therefore, the reward function 
is given by𝑓(𝑆𝑡, 𝑥𝑡) when𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 1,𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 = 1and 𝑆𝑂𝐶 ≥ 𝑆𝑂𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑛. The 
total capacity 𝑄𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑡  of the VPP, given as a part of 𝑆𝑡, is calculated as the sum of the 
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available capacity of n EVs, i.e.,  
𝑄𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑡 =  𝑄1
𝑡 + 𝑄2
𝑡 + 𝑄3
𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝑄𝑖
𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝑄𝑛
𝑡        (11) 
Where, 𝑄𝑖
𝑡 is the available battery capacity of the ith EV in kWh.  
The UC problem selects the least-cost EVs from the set of all available and willing EVs 
in the parking lot (see Section 4.4.2 for details about UC). The control decisions are made 
every 𝑇0 = 15 minutes and the Bellman equation for this optimization is given by 
𝑉𝑡(𝑠𝑡) = 𝐦𝐚𝐱 𝑥𝑡 {𝑓(𝑠𝑡, 𝑥𝑡) + 𝑉𝑡+1(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑥𝑡)}       (12) 
where 𝑉𝑡(𝑠𝑡) represents the value of present and future rewards; 𝑉𝑡+1(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑥𝑡) represents 
the future reward given state 𝑠𝑡+1; and 𝑓(𝑠𝑡, 𝑥𝑡) is the reward which is given by 
𝑓(𝑠𝑡, 𝑥𝑡) = {
−𝑃𝐸𝑉
𝑡 ∑ 𝑄𝑖
𝑡 + 𝑃𝑅𝑡
𝑡 𝑄𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑡𝑁
𝑖=1 ,   𝑥𝑡 = 1
𝑃𝐸𝑉
𝑡 ∑ 𝑄𝑖
𝑡 + 𝑃𝑅𝑡
𝑡 𝑄𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑡𝑁
𝑖=1 ,       𝑥𝑡 = 2
                                           0,      𝑥𝑡 = 3
      (13) 
 
Where, 𝑃𝐸𝑉
𝑡 , a part of 𝑠𝑡, is the price paid to the EV in $/MWh; 𝑃𝑅𝑡
𝑡  , also part of 𝑠𝑡, is the 
wholesale market real-time price in $/MWh. 𝑃𝐸𝑉 could be the same for all periods e.g., 
retail price or could change with time e.g., dynamic retail price. Further, 𝑃𝐸𝑉
𝑡 and 𝑃𝑅𝑡
𝑡  at 
time t and t+1 are independent of each other and 𝑄𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑡  is the total power 
 Superscripted t or subscripted t represents time interval t. The next time interval is t+1. 
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consumed/generated by all the available and willing EVs. The state transition function 
shows how the state variable 𝑄𝑖
𝑡 is related to𝑄𝑖
𝑡+1: 
𝑄𝑖
𝑡+1 = 𝑄𝑖
𝑡 +  Δ𝑄𝑖
𝑡                   (14) 
Δ𝑄𝑖
𝑡 = {
min (𝑟𝑑,𝑖 ∗ 𝑇0,  𝑄𝑖
𝑡 − 𝑄𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑,𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑂𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑛),  𝑥𝑡 = 1
                    min (𝑟𝑐,𝑖 ∗ 𝑇0,  𝑄𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑,𝑖 − 𝑄𝑖
𝑡), 𝑥𝑡 = 2
                                                                    0, 𝑥𝑡 = 3
          (15) 
Where, Δ𝑄𝑖
𝑡 is the change in battery capacity under the three control actions; 𝑟𝑑,𝑖 is the 
discharge rate of the ith EV; 𝑟𝑐,𝑖 is the charge rate of the ith EV; 𝑄𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑,𝑖 is the maximum 
battery capacity of the ith EV; 𝑄𝑖
𝑡is the current battery capacity of the ith EV; 𝑇0is the 
control decision interval. 
4.4.2 Unit Commitment 
In the second level, the parking lot owner uses UC to schedule the least-cost EVs who are 
available, willing and have SOC>SOCmin. UC guarantees the optimal schedule for a VPP 
with varying numbers of EVs. Mathematically, the UC problem can be represented as: 
𝒇(𝑃𝑊𝑖
𝑡, 𝑈𝑖
𝑡) = min ∑ ∑ [𝐶𝑖(𝑃𝑊𝑖
𝑡) +𝑁𝑖=1 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡]𝑈𝑖
𝑡𝑇
𝑡=1      (16) 
    subject to: 
    ℎ𝑈𝐶(𝑥) = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑, 𝑔𝑈𝐶(𝑥) ≤ 0 
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• Where 𝐶𝑖(𝑃𝑊𝑖
𝑡) is the cost of each EV, given as a function of Power (𝑃𝑊𝑖
𝑡 = 𝑄𝑖
𝑡/
𝑡), is expressed in $/hr. Each 𝐶(𝑃𝑊) is given by (9). costStartup  𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡is the 
start-up cost of the EVs (I assume that the startup costs for all the EVs are the 
same); 𝑈𝑖
𝑡 = 0 if the ith unit is unavailable or unwilling or 1 otherwise ℎ𝑈𝐶(𝑥) is 
the set of equality constraints. It comes from balancing the load, 
i.e., 𝑄𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑
𝑡  −  ∑ (𝑄𝑖
𝑡𝑈𝑖
𝑡) = 0 𝑁𝑖=1  for  t=1 to T ; 𝑔𝑈𝐶(𝑥) is the set of inequality 
constraints. And it is limited by𝑄𝑖
𝑡, i.e. 0 ≤  𝑄𝑖
𝑡 ≤  𝑄𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑,𝑖
𝑡 𝑈𝑖
𝑡  for t=1 to T and i=1 
to N. 
4.4.3 Data, Assumptions and Case study 
This model is implemented for Electricity Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT). The 
choices of electricity prices, EV cost function, and other parameters are described below. 
4.4.4 Electricity Prices and Locations 
The price data from ERCOT for 2015 are chosen. 
• Each month of 2015 is represented by a simulated 24-hour period with LMP (for 
energy) and RRP (for capacity) prices changing at a 15-minute interval.  To estimate 
these representative 24 hours for each month, three prices series are generated. In the 
first price series, the price for each 15-minute interval in a day is averaged over the 
month. In the second series, the minimum price, for each interval, over the month, 
represents that time of day. The third series uses the maximum price for each time of 
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day. For example, for January 2015, for 1 pm, the average RT-electricity price was 
23.94$/MWh, the maximum price was 495.37$/MWh and the minimum price was 
0.89$/MWh.  Similarly, the average response reserve price for the same daytime was 
$5.16/MWh; the maximum price was $10.31/MWh and the minimum price was 
$3.08/MWh. All of these prices are obtained from the ERCOTs database for historic 
prices [170]. These prices were for Houston hub. Marginal prices vary in space in time. 
However, for each hour, on average, minimum and maximum prices are similar across 
space. Therefore, the results for other nodes/hubs would be similar. Please refer to Table 
4-3 for comparison with other locations and Table 4-2 for comparison of ERCOT with 
other ISOs. 
Table 4-3: Spatial variation of LMP across different ERCOT hubs for 2015.  
Maximum LMP is seen at Houston Hub 
 
 LMP ($/MWh) 
 Minimum Average Maximum 
Hub Houston -11.58 24.83 3118.2 
Hub North -29.61 23.81 1538.7 
Hub South -67.73 24.41 1538.7 
Hub West -13.40 23.82 1538.7 
 
• For the fixed retail price (scenario 1) and BAU: Retail price of 12.58$/MWh [170] 
was chosen for every time interval in the solution space.  
• For the dynamic retail price (scenario 2): Dynamic retail price was created by 
using (17) and (18) as shown below.  
      𝐷𝑦𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑅𝑃𝑡 = Δ𝐿𝑀𝑃𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑃      (17) 
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ΔLMP𝑡 = {
min(𝐿𝑀𝑃𝑡 − 𝐴𝑣𝑔(𝐿𝑀𝑃), 𝜎𝐿𝑀𝑃),      𝐿𝑀𝑃𝑡 > 𝐴𝑣𝑔(𝐿𝑀𝑃)
max(𝐿𝑀𝑃𝑡 − 𝐴𝑣𝑔(𝐿𝑀𝑃), −𝜎𝐿𝑀𝑃) , 𝐿𝑀𝑃𝑡 < 𝐴𝑣𝑔(𝐿𝑀𝑃)
            (18) 
where, the average LMP, Avg(LMP), for 2015 is 24.83$/MWh; 𝜎𝐿𝑀𝑃 is the calculated 
standard deviation of LMP;  the fixed retail price FixedRP is 12.58$/MWh. 
• For 50% profit sharing (scenario 3): Wholesale LMP and RRP prices are used and 
it is assumed that the VPP shares 50% of its reward with the participating EVs. 
4.4.5 Electric Vehicle Cost Function 
EV cost functions are linear in charge/discharge space, i.e.: 
  𝐶(𝑃𝑊) = (𝑏 + Δ𝑏)𝑃𝑊 + 𝑎          (19) 
Where b is a constant expressed in $/kWh and represents the EV deterioration that 
happens with every charge/discharge cycle. Since it is impractical to count the 
charge/discharge cycles for EVs, the detailed representation of b was adapted from [171; 
172]:  
𝑏 = 𝛾
𝐶𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦
𝑄𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦
            (20) 
𝑄𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 = 2 ∗ 𝐿𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 ∗ 𝐶𝑎𝑝 ∗ 𝐷𝑜𝐷                 (21) 
Where𝐶𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦 is the capital cost of a battery in $ and 𝑄𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦is the total energy 
transferred during the lifetime of a battery. 𝛾 represents the reduction in battery cost due 
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to EV subsidies. 𝛾 is assumed to be 30% . This was because in Texas the EVs get $7500 
[161] in federal and $2500 [162]in state subsidies.  I assume that these subsidies are 
reflected in their battery costs. As a comparison, according to Hardman et. al [173], EV 
incentives range from $2500 to $20000 per vehicle.  Cap is the battery capacity in kWh. 
Battery prices are taken from manufacturers web pages. The retail price of Nissan Leaf 
24kWh battery pack is $5,500 before tax [159]. The battery pack of  the Tesla Model S is 
$12,000 for its 85kWh pack [160].   𝐿𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 is the battery life in cycles and DoD is the 
depth of discharge. These values are from figure 3 of Han and Han’s paper [172]. 
All these parameters are used to get the 𝑄𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 range for Nissan Leaf and Tesla-S 
as shown in the table below. This information is used to calculate the range of b for these 
vehicles. It is assumed that vehicles in the parking lot are characterized by different 
values of b, and that the heterogeneity of vehicles regarding b can be represented by a 
uniform distribution. An equal number of Nissan and Tesla vehicles are selected to 
equalize their probability of being used. Further, a fleet of 20 cars is assumed to be 
available at any given period. This also ensures that there is enough capacity for the VPP 
to participate in the ERCOT’s market.  
 
Table 4-4: EV battery characteristics and coefficients 
 Capacity (kWh) Lcycle %DoD b ($/kWh) 
Tesla-S 85 700 
4500 
90 
6 
0.034 
0.078 
Nissan Leaf 24 700 90 0.055 
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 Capacity (kWh) Lcycle %DoD b ($/kWh) 
4500 6 0.127 
 
•  b for each EV does not change over with every charge and discharge cycle. 
• a represents the hourly Operation and Maintenance (O&M) costs that are incurred 
irrespective of the charge and discharge cycles. One example would be battery insurance 
that the EV owner must pay irrespective of the charge/discharge cycle. It is expressed in 
$/hr.  
4.4.6 Other Parameters 
Besides parameters for EV cost functions, there are a few additional assumptions. The 
first is EVs option to limit the maximum number of charge/discharge cycles that happen 
every day. It is assumed that, for a given day, each EV can charge/discharge for ten 
cycles. For comparison, Honarmand et al., [174] assumes that newer EVs can 
charge/discharge to eight cycles every day. Second, I assume that there are three sets of 
EVs that enter the VPP a) a group that arrives at 6 am and leaves at 2 pm; b) a group that 
arrives at 2 pm and leaves at 10 pm; c) a group that arrives at 10 pm and leaves at 6 am. 
Third, among these sets of EVs, it is assumed that an EV is either a Nissan Leaf or Tesla 
S - the top two best-selling EVs in the United States in 2015 [175]. Minimum SOCs are 
randomly assigned between 20% and 80% to each of the available EVs. Further, it is 
assumed that each EV can be charged to 40% of its capacity in 1 hour using fast chargers 
[160]. 
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4.5 Results and Discussion 
The results illustrate that the total amount of energy drawn from and injected into the 
ERCOT region each year varied across scenarios.  For the fixed retail price scenario, 
results showed that 808MWh were discharged and 411MWh were charged; in the 
dynamic retail price scenario, 714MWh were discharged and 273MWh charged; and, in 
the 50% profit sharing scenario, 885MWh were discharged and 299MWh were charged. 
More important, with the present market rules, the results illustrate that V2G is not 
profitable to the EVs and that cheaper EVs are likely to lose more than expensive EVs, as 
described below. 
4.5.1 Profit  – VPP Makes Money, EVs Don’t  
Table 4-5 presents the bounds of VPP and EVs profit for 2015, when using average, 
minimum and maximum LMP and RRP. In all the scenarios, the VPP would make more 
profit from BAU (The BAU case for EVs represents their monthly costs of charging 
batteries) case and the system operator would get energy and ancillary services. With the 
present market rules, there is an insufficient reward for the EVs to cover their battery 
deterioration cost. Therefore, they are likely to lose more by participating in a V2G 
system through a VPP. 
Table 4-5: Rewards made by VPP and EVs in different scenarios 
 Profit ($) 
VPP ($) EV TypeI EV TypeII 
BAU NaN  -162 -454 
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 Profit ($) 
VPP ($) EV TypeI EV TypeII 
Fixed retail price scenario [1952, 18467] [-351, -324] [-1182, -1126] 
Dynamic retail price scenario [1913, 16889] [-353, -295] [-1166, -1007] 
50% profit sharing scenario [816, 11209] [-357, -82] [-1052, -726] 
 
4.5.2 Cheaper EVs Lose More 
Another interesting result is illustrated in Figure 4-3. For all the scenarios, EVs with a 
comparatively lower battery cost ($/kWh) lose more money when compared to EVs with 
a higher battery cost. This is because the EVs with lower battery costs are cheaper and 
thus will be used more.  None of the scenarios could generate enough revenue for these 
EVs. Therefore, the EVs with smaller $/kWh is used more and they lose more. This 
disadvantage for cheaper EVs would exist when EVs are dispatched using least-cost 
methods like economic dispatch, unit commitment or merit order dispatch. It could, 
however, be mitigated if battery cost is reduced or if EVs limit how many charge-
discharge cycles they allow daily. 
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Figure 4-3: Yearly profit in $ for all the EVs,  
Per unit cost EV-type2 is lower than that of EV-type1. Therefore, EV-type2 gets extensively used. When 
extensive use is combined with lower profit (all the scenarios), EV-type2 loses more money 
4.5.3 Sensitivity 
 The specific results are dependent on the assumptions and the data choices that are made. 
However, the results (that EVs will lose and VPP will make more and EVs with lower 
$/kWh will lose more money relative to BAU) are robust to changes in electricity costs. 
To illustrate this, three cases and a few sub-cases are simulated. Sensitivity case 1 
illustrates the change in rewards if battery costs are reduced. Sensitivity case 2 illustrates 
the change in rewards for the choice of average, minimum and maximum LMP vs. using 
the actual LMP. Sensitivity case 3 illustrates the change in rewards if the EVs participate 
only when price exceeds a threshold. Sensitivity case 4 illustrates the redistribution of 
benefits between the VPP and EVs. 
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To illustrate the change in battery cost, three sub-cases are created: 1-a) where 𝛾 is 5%; 
1-b) where 𝛾 is 100% and an additional benefit is $50/MWh; 1-c) where 𝛾 is 30% and the 
additional benefit is $50/MWh. The additional benefit illustrates a new market product 
that provides flexibility with an average market price of $50/MWh. Flexibility is the 
extent to which an electrical system can change its generation or consumption in response 
to changing power system conditions [176].  Products that provide peak-shaving and 
renewable consumption, for example, are valued for their ability to increase the flexibility 
of the power system. This reward is later used to illustrate the significance of market 
rules. 
Table 4-6: Summary of sensitivity cases 
Case Name Description Reason for case selection 
Case 1a 𝛾 =5% To illustrate near term (5 years) plausible 
reduction in cost 
Case 1b 𝛾 =100% with extra $50/MWh reward To illustrate edge case 
Case 1c 𝛾 =30% with extra $50/MWh reward To illustrate far term (5-10 years) reduction 
in cost 
Case 2 RT actual LMP To illustrate the choice of using 
representative hours for each month instead 
of average, minimum and maximum 
Case 3 EVs only participate above a threshold 
price 
To illustrate the impact of EVs choice if the 
price exceeds a threshold 
Case 4 Cap VPPs profit and share it with EVs To illustrate a case where regulatory 
agencies like a Utility Commission can cap 
VPPs profit and re-distribute among the 
EVs. 
 
First, the Fixed Retail Price scenario is examined. Results indicate that, in all these cases, 
VPP rewards were relatively unaffected. On average, EV reward increases by 79% (-
$161 in both cases versus -$766 in the fixed retail price scenario) for sensitivity case 1-a 
(𝛾 is 5%) and sensitivity case 1-c (𝛾 is 30% and $50/MWh benefit) when compared to the 
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Fixed Retail Price scenario. This is because the reward in sensitivity cases 1-a and 1-c is 
more than the battery operating cost.  However, in sensitivity case 1-b (𝛾 is 100% and 
$50/MWh benefit), when compared to the fixed retail price scenario, EV reward 
decreases by 144% (-$1869 in this case vs. -$766 in fixed retail price scenario).  This is 
because the reward is insufficient to overcome the increase in operating costs. 
In sensitivity case 2, real 15 minutes LMP (instead of average, minimum and maximum 
LMP) are used. The results for this sensitivity case are within the bounds of minimum 
and maximum values given in Table 4-6. As an example, for the fixed retail price 
scenario, the EVs on an average lost around $750. This is well within the bounds of the 
results from Table 4-5. In this table, for the fixed retail price scenario, the use of 
maximum LMP yields an average loss of $766. Similarly, for the dynamic retail price 
scenario, the EVs lose $788 and for 50% profit sharing scenario, they lose $710 while 
using the real LMP. All of these are well within the bounds of our results. 
In sensitivity case 3, a threshold price that would make V2G profitable to the EVs, is 
identified. For fixed and dynamic retail price scenario, participation at a retail threshold 
price larger than $34/MWh would make V2G profitable (when compared to BAU, 
though the cash flow is still negative) to the EVs. Similarly, for the 50% profit sharing 
scenario, participation at a threshold price larger than $30/MWh would allow EVs to 
break even.  
In sensitivity case 4, the VPP's reward is capped such that the EVs, on an average, also 
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make a profit. This is a case where regulatory agencies intervene and re-distribute the 
wealth or, alternatively, the EVs and VPP come to an agreement on wealth re-distribution 
among themselves. For EV type I to make $162 and type II to make $454 more than 
BAU, such redistribution is only possible if the VPP makes $15,330 in the fixed retail 
price scenario and $15,190 in the dynamic retail price scenario. Any penny that is made 
over this amount would go into the profits of the VPP. For example, in the fixed retail 
price scenario, the VPP is likely to earn between $1,952 and $18,467. If the VPP makes 
the maximum amount, i.e., $18,467, $15,330 can be redistributed to the EVs. In such a 
case, the VPP's profit is $3137, type I EV's profit is $162 and type II EV's profit is $454 
more than BAU.  
In sum, as shown in Table 4-6, the sensitivity cases indicate that the results are robust to 
changes in parameters: without enough market reward, V2G is profitable for everyone 
except the EVs. Sensitivity case 3 makes V2G profitable to the EVs. However, it curbs 
the grid services unless the grid operator is willing to pay and has abundant ready-to-
dispatch reserves. Sensitivity case 4 also shows that participation in a V2G could be 
profitable to the EVs if the VPP makes around $15K and redistributes their profits; and 
this is impractical.  
The results and sensitivities around results show interesting findings. Some of these are 
discussed in the upcoming paragraphs. According to IEA[177], the electricity sector 
accounts for 42% (13.51 Gton CO2e) and the transportation sector accounts for 23% (7.4 
Gton CO2e) of global CO2e emissions. Without reducing emissions from these sectors, it 
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is unlikely that the emissions reduction targets will be achieved. The International Energy 
Agency [178] estimates that the electricity sector should be completely de-carbonized 
and annual road energy consumption should decrease by 17% (around 413 mill tons of 
Oil equivalent) by 2050 to maintain an acceptable level of CO2e. Countries around the 
world have started to engineer solutions to this problem. In a system with clean grid mix, 
EVs can become significant contributors to the solution in both sectors. EVs replace 
traditional gasoline-based modes of propulsion, especially for passenger cars, which leads 
to increased efficiency and reduced tailpipe emissions. They also help in replacement of 
traditional fossil fuel-fired power plants with renewables by providing solutions to 
renewable intermittency problems and improving power system reliability. 
At present, EVs represent 0.1% of the total number of passenger cars globally [147]. 
Though the percent share is small, the stock has increased over the past decade. 
According to the International Energy Agency [147], globally, the number of EVs have 
increased from 1.67k in 2005 to 1257k in 2015. The increase has been facilitated by 
global, national and regional policies: the Electric Vehicle Initiative aims to deploy 20 
million EVs globally by 2020; China has implemented an excise incentive of $6000-
$10000 for purchasing an EV [147]; the Zero Emission Vehicle (ZEV) program in 
California calls for having 1.5 million ZEVs in California by 2025 (in 2015, 24 million 
vehicles were registered in California)[179]. Such policies create markets for EVs, make 
them commercially viable, and have increased their penetration. 
Unfortunately, V2G systems have not been able to catch up with the growing number of 
       
 
105 
EVs. To fully realize commercially viable V2G systems, several barriers including the 
following need to be addressed: cost, EV range, optimization, control, charging access 
and infrastructure, impact to the grid, consumers' lack of awareness of the EV-V2G 
option, and supportive market rules. The literature is beginning to acknowledge the 
importance of incentives, including market rules. For example, Sarah Keay-Bright [180] 
argues that proper design of time-varying dynamic price, demand response and proper 
value of flexibility would increase the penetration of EVs in the European Union. 
Similarly, the study done by Paine et al. [146] highlights the importance of market rules. 
They find that market rules could change the yearly reward of the pumped hydro station 
by 2.4 times ($4.64k) when installed in Mid Continent ISO (MISO) region than in ISO-
New England region. Another pragmatic example that highlights the importance of 
market rules is the increased penetration of renewables in areas within wholesale 
electricity markets of the United States that have access to the spot market [181] with 
transparent and fair rules and improved granularity in pricing and dispatch. ISO/RTO 
Council [182] highlights the importance of fair market rules. Some examples of market 
rules that facilitated renewable penetrations are the introduction of the Energy Imbalance 
Market in the California ISO region and Dispatchable Intermittent Resource in the Mid-
Continent ISO region. 
Like renewables or pumped hydro, V2G systems (and therefore EVs) would further 
blossom if there were appropriate market rules and supporting policies that ensured that 
participants earned enough rewards. This essay highlights the importance of such rules. A 
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two-stage optimization, as described in Section 4.2, is modeled.  It is assumed that the 
VPP participates in the wholesale electricity market for energy and ancillary service 
(capacity) and the market rules for the EVs are changed. Three scenarios are created. 
These scenarios represent three market rules for EVs where they interact with the VPP in 
a) fixed retail price b) dynamic retail price c) 50% reward sharing. This model is applied 
to ERCOT electricity market, and the results illustrate the following.  
• In all the scenarios, a centralized system based V2G is always profitable to the 
VPP. However, it is different for an EV. For example, in Fixed, dynamic retail 
price scenario and 50% profit sharing scenario, EVs would lose money when 
compared to business as usual. However, if the market price is increased or if the 
battery costs are substantially decreased, or if the EVs chose to participate only if 
the price exceeded a threshold, V2G could become a profitable option (or at least 
better than BAU) to an EV.  
• For fixed, dynamic retail price scenario and 50% profit sharing scenario, EVs with 
lower per unit battery costs may actually end up losing more money because of 
extensive overuse (see Figure 4-3) thereby deteriorating the battery.  
 The results illustrate that, with high battery costs and existing market rules, V2G would 
not be profitable to the EVs; therefore, owners are unlikely to participate in this system. 
V2G can provide numerous additional services than energy, capacity or regulation. A 
V2G system with EV participation can help accommodate surplus renewable generation 
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or provide storage to compensate for the intermittency of renewables. It can shave peak 
and can provide quick ramping capabilities. However, the present market rules do not 
allow these functions of EVs to be properly rewarded. Therefore, newer market products 
like a peak shaving product; a renewable consuming product or a flexibility product 
could help in improving the rewards EVs get for participating in a V2G system. For 
example, provided the battery costs are reduced by 5-30%, the introduction of a new 
market product (or a subsidy) worth 50$/MWh would significantly (79%) increase the 
rewards for the EVs (see Section 4.5.3). However, without such products, things could be 
even worse than the status quo. Since the renewables have low operating costs, they 
could bring market prices down and can even make these prices go negative [183]. That 
means, with increasing renewables, the reward that the EVs normally get from the market 
would further be reduced. A lower reward would make the EVs unwilling to participate 
in a V2G (see Section 4.8 on limitations).   
To avoid these outcomes, EVs would need to be compensated sufficiently.  One option to 
consider would be to use market products like flexibility or renewable support service or 
a peak shaving product. Alternatively, EVs could choose to participate only above a 
threshold price that is higher than average LMP. However, this option limits the ability of 
V2G to provide grid services. Finally, another option would be to use alternate means 
like Combined Heat and Power (CHP), water heaters and demand response. Some of 
these like water heaters could be even cheaper than a V2G scheme. Further research 
should thoroughly analyze all these alternatives.   
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4.6 Conclusion 
On average, a private vehicle is parked for 95% of its lifetime. Parked EVs, both fully 
electric and their hybrid counterparts can be used to provide grid services and can help in 
emissions reduction. A key to realizing these benefits is an actively functioning V2G 
system that depends, in turn, on enough rewards of the system to participants. On top of 
battery costs, the way in which market rules are established is likely to have an impact on 
these rewards.  
This essay investigates the implications of battery costs and different market rules on the 
rewards of a V2G to participants by developing a model of a centralized V2G system and 
applying it to the wholesale electricity market in Texas. In a centralized system, EVs act 
as micro-generators and participate in the wholesale market through a VPP (e.g., an 
aggregator or a parking lot).  I asses three potential market rule scenarios examining 
different ways that EV owners are compensated. In Scenario 1, EVs are paid based on a 
fixed retail market price; in Scenario 2, EVs are paid in time-varying retail prices that 
change with changing wholesale market conditions; in Scenario 3, the VPP shares 50% of 
its total reward with the participating EVs. Sensitivity analysis is conducted to assess the 
impact of subsidies and of enhanced rewards for providing flexibility services. 
The results illustrate that, while the V2G system is always financially profitable to the 
VPP and the system operator gets grid services, the EVs often lose money. Cheaper EVs 
(lower per unit output-battery cost ($/kWh)) could lose more by participating because of 
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extensive battery over-use and insufficient reward at current market prices.  
4.7 Policy Implication 
The concept of V2Gs has been in the academic literature since the 1990s. There have also 
been a few pilot projects, but V2Gs remain commercially unviable. Therefore, this essay 
addresses the key policy issues for V2G as described in section 4.3. 
Analysis of economic/market aspect of V2G illustrated that the current market rewards 
are not enough for the vehicle owners to participate in a V2G. Therefore, to improve the 
rewards for EVs and thus to make their participation economically viable, policymakers 
like the National Science Foundation and the Department of Energy could invest in 
reducing battery costs or policymakers like FERC could spur the introduction of newer 
market products such as a peak-shaving product or a renewable consuming/flexibility 
product. In the peak shaving product, the EVs would get extra revenue for discharging 
during peak hours and charging during off-peak hours. For the renewable 
consuming/flexibility product, EVs could get extra revenue to prevent wind or solar 
curtailment and to compensate for the intermittency of the renewable resources. All these 
options are pragmatic and would compensate EVs in a V2G system for providing their 
services. The variety of policymakers listed above, could also work together and 
introduce additional subsidies, like Production Tax Credits, to the EVs for participating in 
the V2G, or adopt a mixture of these policies. These changes would help to make V2G 
systems commercially sustainable. Commercially viable V2G would aid in the reduction 
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of emissions, improvement in power system reliability and a decrease in renewable-
curtailments. 
4.8 Limitation and Further Research 
The DP-UC method used this essay applies to any VPP-EV-market scenario that uses day 
ahead or real-time prices. However, the results are only relevant to specific markets that 
have nodal prices for energy and ancillary services. Moreover, the assumptions impact 
the results. These assumptions are laid out in the Methods Section, and most of them are 
analyzed in sensitivity Section. However, a few are open for extended analysis and 
further research. These include understanding the impact of rewards on a) EV's 
willingness to participate and b) improving EVs market diffusion. Another exciting 
avenue would study the effects of EVs length of stay, e.g., three eight-hour shifts (nursing 
home) or two 12-hour shift (Control center of a power plant) or sporadic entry/exit 
(parking ramp close to a cafe), on their rewards. Understanding these would help in 
guiding the creation of policies to improve EV's market penetration and their 
participation in V2G. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
In today’s world, energy policies play a vital role in any country’s strives towards 
sustainable economic development.  The effectiveness of any energy policy depends on 
how it interacts with other engineering, economic and socio-political aspects surrounding 
it. These are the holistic-triad. However, both in academia and practice, one or more of 
pillars in this triad are often neglected. Such elements can lead to unsuccessful or 
ineffective policy formulation, analysis and implementation. This dissertation highlights 
the importance of such understudied aspects using three examples viz, a) Carbon tax b) 
CHP and c) EVs providing V2G services. 
The essay on Carbon tax reveals that successful implementation of a carbon tax requires 
an understanding of how a carbon tax will change power system operations and be 
shaped by the existing policy and operational context of the electric power system. The 
results show that a large price spread could change the generator dispatch, reduce 
average prices, and diminish the carbon tax effectiveness. If power-engineering 
aspects were not studied, these interactions would never be highlighted, and the predicted 
efficacy of a carbon tax would be significantly different from the actual efficacy. 
The essay on CHP finds that financial viability is necessary but not an enough condition 
for developing a CHP project. The most significant non-financial barriers are a) the 
business model of the electrical utility b) negative subjective impressions based on 
anecdotal evidence and c) allocating the risks and benefits of many costs and 
revenue streams. Overcoming these barriers would help to exploit CHP potential, 
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improve energy efficiency, and, in the case of the newest CHP systems, provide 
flexibility services to the grid. To overcome these barriers, clear new policies are 
necessary. If the sociopolitical aspects were not studied, these non-financial barriers 
would never be revealed. 
The essay on EVs investigates the implications of battery costs and different market rules 
on the rewards of a V2G to participants by developing a model of a centralized V2G 
system and applying it to the wholesale electricity market in Texas. The results reveal 
that, while the V2G system is always financially profitable to the VPP and the system 
operator gets grid services, the EVs often lose money. Further, cheaper EVs (lower per 
unit output-battery cost ($/kWh)) could lose more by participating because of 
extensive battery over-use and insufficient reward at current market prices. If these 
economic/market aspects were not studied, the ultimate barrier (profitability) that could 
prevent EVs from participating in the V2G scheme would never be revealed.  
Therefore, for an effective energy policy, holistic insights of the triad are necessary. Such 
insights help in discovering phenomenon (as illustrated in prior paragraphs) that would 
sometimes counteract and at other times enhance the effectiveness of the policy in 
question. 
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7. APPENDIX 
 
7.1 Interacting Policies in Power System 
7.2 Relevant Network Data 
Generator data 
Bu
s 
Pg 
(MW) 
Qg 
(MW) 
Q 
Max 
(MW) 
Q 
Min 
(MW) 
Vg 
(p.u) 
P 
Max 
(MW) 
P 
Min 
(MW) 
Generato
r 
Name 
1 10 0 10 0 1.035 20 16 U20 
1 10 0 10 0 1.035 20 16 U20 
1 76 0 30 -25 1.035 76 15.2 U76 
1 76 0 30 -25 1.035 76 15.2 U76 
2 10 0 10 0 1.035 20 16 U20 
2 10 0 10 0 1.035 20 16 U20 
2 76 0 30 -25 1.035 76 15.2 U76 
2 76 0 30 -25 1.035 76 15.2 U76 
7 80 0 60 0 1.025 100 25 U100 
7 80 0 60 0 1.025 100 25 U100 
7 80 0 60 0 1.025 100 25 U100 
13 95.1 0 80 0 1.02 197 69 U197 
13 95.1 0 80 0 1.02 197 69 U197 
13 95.1 0 80 0 1.02 197 69 U197 
14 0 35.3 200 -50 0.98 0 0 
Syn 
Cond 
15 12 0 6 0 1.014 12 2.4 U12 
15 12 0 6 0 1.014 12 2.4 U12 
15 12 0 6 0 1.014 12 2.4 U12 
15 12 0 6 0 1.014 12 2.4 U12 
15 12 0 6 0 1.014 12 2.4 U12 
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15 155 0 80 -50 1.014 155 54.3 U155 
16 155 0 80 -50 1.017 155 54.3 U155 
18 400 0 200 -50 1.05 400 100 U400 
21 400 0 200 -50 1.05 400 100 U400 
22 50 0 16 -10 1.05 50 10 U50 
22 50 0 16 -10 1.05 50 10 U50 
22 50 0 16 -10 1.05 50 10 U50 
22 50 0 16 -10 1.05 50 10 U50 
22 50 0 16 -10 1.05 50 10 U50 
22 50 0 16 -10 1.05 50 10 U50 
23 155 0 80 -50 1.05 155 54.3 U155 
23 155 0 80 -50 1.05 155 54.3 U155 
23 350 0 150 -25 1.05 350 140 U350 
 
Generator Cost data 
Cost 
Curve 
Type 
Start 
Up ($) 
Shut 
Down ($) 
Num 
Coeff c ($/MW2hr) b ($/MWhr) a ($/hr) Generator Name 
2 1500 0 3 
It is same as the bidding data of essay 1 
U20 
2 1500 0 3 U20 
2 1500 0 3 U76 
2 1500 0 3 U76 
2 1500 0 3 U20 
2 1500 0 3 U20 
2 1500 0 3 U76 
2 1500 0 3 U76 
2 1500 0 3 U100 
2 1500 0 3 U100 
2 1500 0 3 U100 
2 1500 0 3 U197 
2 1500 0 3 U197 
2 1500 0 3 U197 
2 1500 0 3 0 0 0 SynCond 
2 1500 0 3 It is same as the bidding data in essay 1 U12 
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2 1500 0 3 U12 
2 1500 0 3 U12 
2 1500 0 3 U12 
2 1500 0 3 U12 
2 1500 0 3 U155 
2 1500 0 3 U155 
2 1500 0 3 U400 
2 1500 0 3 U400 
2 1500 0 3 U50 
2 1500 0 3 U50 
2 1500 0 3 U50 
2 1500 0 3 U50 
2 1500 0 3 U50 
2 1500 0 3 U50 
2 1500 0 3 U155 
2 1500 0 3 U155 
2 1500 0 3 U350 
 
Bus data  
Bus 
No Pd (MW) Qd (MW) Vm (p.u) Va (rad) 
Base 
KV 
V 
Max (p.u) 
V 
Min (p.u) 
1 108 22 1 0 138 1.05 0.95 
2 97 20 1 0 138 1.05 0.95 
3 180 37 1 0 138 1.05 0.95 
4 74 15 1 0 138 1.05 0.95 
5 71 14 1 0 138 1.05 0.95 
6 136 28 1 0 138 1.05 0.95 
7 125 25 1 0 138 1.05 0.95 
8 171 35 1 0 138 1.05 0.95 
9 175 36 1 0 138 1.05 0.95 
10 195 40 1 0 138 1.05 0.95 
11 0 0 1 0 230 1.05 0.95 
12 0 0 1 0 230 1.05 0.95 
13 265 54 1 0 230 1.05 0.95 
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14 194 39 1 0 230 1.05 0.95 
15 317 64 1 0 230 1.05 0.95 
16 100 20 1 0 230 1.05 0.95 
17 0 0 1 0 230 1.05 0.95 
18 333 68 1 0 230 1.05 0.95 
19 181 37 1 0 230 1.05 0.95 
20 128 26 1 0 230 1.05 0.95 
21 0 0 1 0 230 1.05 0.95 
22 0 0 1 0 230 1.05 0.95 
23 0 0 1 0 230 1.05 0.95 
24 0 0 1 0 230 1.05 0.95 
 
Branch data 
Fr To r (p.u) x (p.u) b (p.u) 
Rate 
A (MW) 
Rate 
B (MW) 
Rate 
C (MW) 
1 2 0.0026 0.0139 0.4611 250 250 200 
1 3 0.0546 0.2112 0.0572 175 208 220 
1 5 0.0218 0.0845 0.0229 175 208 220 
2 4 0.0328 0.1267 0.0343 175 208 220 
2 6 0.0497 0.192 0.052 175 208 220 
3 9 0.0308 0.119 0.0322 250 208 220 
3 24 0.0023 0.0839 0 400 510 600 
4 9 0.0268 0.1037 0.0281 175 208 220 
5 10 0.0228 0.0883 0.0239 175 208 220 
6 10 0.0139 0.0605 2.459 400 193 200 
7 8 0.0159 0.0614 0.0166 400 208 220 
8 9 0.0427 0.1651 0.0447 400 208 220 
8 10 0.0427 0.1651 0.0447 400 208 220 
9 11 0.0023 0.0839 0 400 510 600 
9 12 0.0023 0.0839 0 400 510 600 
10 11 0.0023 0.0839 0 400 510 600 
10 12 0.0023 0.0839 0 400 510 600 
11 13 0.0061 0.0476 0.0999 500 600 625 
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7.3 Relavant Bidding Data 
 
S.No Name Coefficients 
a ($/hr) b ($/MWhr) c ($/MW2hr) 
1 L265 -105 -8500 1.05 
2 L100 -49.2618 -7500 0.492618 
3 L195 -90 -6500 0.9 
4 L317 -1.2513 -5557 0.012513 
5 L71 -37.5 -5200 0.375 
6 L125 -7.9008 -5200 0.079008 
7 L175 -60 -5200 0.6 
14 11 0.0054 0.0418 0.0879 500 625 625 
12 13 0.0061 0.0476 0.0999 500 625 625 
12 23 0.0124 0.0966 0.203 500 625 625 
13 23 0.0111 0.0865 0.1818 500 625 625 
14 16 0.005 0.0389 0.0818 500 625 625 
15 16 0.0022 0.0173 0.0364 500 600 625 
15 21 0.0063 0.049 0.103 500 600 625 
15 21 0.0063 0.049 0.103 500 600 625 
15 24 0.0067 0.0519 0.1091 500 600 625 
16 17 0.0033 0.0259 0.0545 500 600 625 
16 19 0.003 0.0231 0.0485 500 600 625 
17 18 0.0018 0.0144 0.0303 500 600 625 
17 22 0.0135 0.1053 0.2212 500 600 625 
18 21 0.0033 0.0259 0.0545 500 600 625 
18 21 0.0033 0.0259 0.0545 500 600 625 
19 20 0.0051 0.0396 0.0833 500 600 625 
19 20 0.0051 0.0396 0.0833 500 600 625 
20 23 0.0028 0.0216 0.0455 500 600 625 
20 23 0.0028 0.0216 0.0455 500 600 625 
21 22 0.0087 0.0678 0.1424 500 600 625 
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8 L74 -75 -4700 0.75 
9 L108 -75 -4200 0.75 
10 L194 -0.75 -4200 0.0075 
11 L97 -1.8 -3800 0.018 
12 L136 -1.875 -3500 0.01875 
13 L171 -3 -3500 0.03 
14 L180 -48.75 -3200 0.4875 
15 L181 -7.5 -3000 0.075 
16 L128 -6.75 -2700 0.0675 
17 L133 -3.75 -2564 0.0375 
18 U50 0.001 0.001 0 
19 U50 0.001 0.001 0 
20 U50 0.001 0.001 0 
21 U50 0.001 0.001 0 
22 U50 0.001 0.001 0 
23 U50 0.001 0.001 0 
24 U400 395.3749 4.4231 0.000213 
25 U400 395.3749 4.4231 0.000213 
26 U197 17.27704 11.3128 + tax 0.065682 
27 U197 17.27704 11.3128 + tax 0.065682 
28 U197 17.27704 11.3128 + tax 0.065682 
29 U12  17.27704 11.3128 + tax 0.065682 
30 U12 17.27704 11.3128 + tax 0.065682 
31 U12 17.27704 11.3128 + tax 0.065682 
32 U12 17.27704 11.3128 + tax 0.065682 
33 U12 17.27704 11.3128 + tax 0.065682 
34 U350 665.11 11.8495 + tax 0.004895 
35 U155 382.2391 12.3883 + tax 0.008342 
36 U155 382.2391 12.3883 + tax 0.008342 
37 U155 382.2391 12.3883 + tax 0.008342 
38 U155 382.2391 12.3883 + tax 0.008342 
39 U76 212.3076 16.0811 + tax 0.014142 
40 U76 212.3076 16.0811 + tax 0.014142 
41 U76 212.3076 16.0811 + tax 0.014142 
42 U76 212.3076 16.0811 + tax 0.014142 
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43 U100 0.001 22 0 
44 U100 0.001 22 0 
45 U100 0.001 22 0 
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7.4 Non-Financial Barriers to Combined Heat and Power 
7.5 Sample Recruitment Email 
 To: <Name> 
 Cc: <Name1> 
Subject: Request for research interview 
 
 Dear Ms./Mr. <Name> 
 
 I am a PhD student at the Humphrey School of Public Affairs and contacting you as part 
of a research study on Combined Heat and Power based at the University of 
Minnesota.  We are studying opportunities and barriers affecting adoption of CHP in 
Minnesota are particularly interested to understand the technology from your perspective. 
 
 I would like to interview you about your work with <Company> and your experiences 
with CHP projects.  Given your background and experience, we believe that your 
perspective will provide critical insights into the opportunities and challenges facing the 
deployment of the technology.  I anticipate that the interview will take less than one hour. 
 
I am working with <Name 1> at the <Location> as project advisers and I would be happy 
to provide you with more details about our team, the project, and our learning objectives 
if you 
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wish. 
 
I know you are busy, but would welcome a time to speak with you in the following 
weeks. If you would like to email me a few times which would work for you, I would 
appreciate it, if not, I can follow up with a call to schedule. 
 
Best regards, 
 ____________ 
 Vivek Bhandari 
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7.6 Sample Consent Form 
The purpose of this form is to provide you information that may affect your decision as to 
whether to participate in this research study.  If you decide to participate in this study, 
this form will also be used to record your consent. 
You are invited to participate in a research project about decision-making in Combined 
Heat and Power. The purpose of this study is to understand your perspective of 
technology diffusion for Combined Heat and Power.  
The research is guided by the following questions: <Research Questions>  
You were selected to participate in this project because you are especially knowledgeable 
about CHP.  The study is sponsored by the <DONOR>. 
What will I be asked to do? 
If you agree to participate in this study, we will ask you to participate in an interview.  
We may contact you individually later (within 1 year of the interview) to ask to follow 
up.  The interview will last between ½ an hour to 1 hour. We will ask you to discuss a set 
of questions surrounding Combined Heat and Power, with a focus on your experience 
with it and perceptions of it.  You do not need to respond to every question.  The 
interview discussion will be audio recorded to ensure that transcripts of the session are 
accurate. After sessions are transcribed, recordings will be destroyed.    
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What are the risks involved in this study? 
The risks associated in this study are minimal and are not greater than risks ordinarily 
encountered in daily life. 
What are the possible benefits of this study? 
You will receive no direct benefit from participating in this study; however, the study 
may benefit society by contributing to U.S. energy security and sustainable development.  
Do I have to participate? 
No.  Your participation is voluntary.  You may decide not to participate or to withdraw at 
any time without your current or future relations with the University of Minnesota. If you 
decide to participate, you are free to refuse to answer any questions that may make you 
feel uncomfortable. You can withdraw at any time without negative consequences.  
Who will know about my participation in this research study? 
This study is confidential. We will keep the records of this study private. Other members 
of your focus group will, however, know about your participation. No identifiers linking 
you to this study will be included in any sort of report that might be published.  Research 
records will be stored securely and only members of the research team who have an 
approved report demonstrating successful completion of training in Social and Behavioral 
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Research Investigations on file with the University of Minnesota will have access to the 
records. 
If you choose to participate in the interview, you will be audio recorded.  Any audio 
recordings will be stored securely and only members of the research team who have an 
approved report demonstrating successful completion of training in Social and Behavioral 
Research Investigations on file with the University of Minnesota will have access to the 
original recordings.  Recordings will be kept for up to 2 years from the date of your 
interview and then erased.   
To ensure accuracy, professional transcribers will transcribe interview sessions.  Prior to 
transcription, we will replace participants’ names with numbers to protect identities. 
Following transcription, we will ‘clean’ the file, removing names used in conversation.   
In any reports we might publish, we will not include any information that will make it 
possible to identify you or your organization, unless you state your preference that we do 
so. Because we have learned that some individuals prefer their statements attributed to 
themselves, we have made provision for that option. At the end of this form, you will be 
asked to indicate your preference regarding attribution.   
Whom do I contact with questions about the research?  
If you have questions regarding this study, you may contact Name 1 <Email 1> and 
Name 2 <Email 2> 
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Whom do I contact about my rights as a research participant?   
The Institutional Review Board at University of Minnesota has reviewed this research 
study.  For research-related problems or questions regarding your rights as a research 
participant, you can contact these offices at <Phone> or <email>. 
Preference regarding attribution 
Please indicate your choice by circling one statement from the following list:  
I prefer that any quotations from me be used in the following way: 
□ Quotes without attribution (research team will use language that does not identify 
you or your organization) 
□ Quotes attributed to me 
Signature   
Please be sure you have read the above information, asked questions and received 
answers to your satisfaction.  You will be given a copy of the consent form for your 
records.  By signing this document, you consent to participate in this study. 
 
Signature of Participant: _____________________________ Date: ______________ 
Printed Name: _________________________________________________________   
Signature of Person Obtaining Consent: __________________Date: ______________ 
Printed Name: _____________________________________________________ 
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7.7 Interview Subjects and The Recruitment Process 
Interview subjects/experts were recruited from attendees at a public stakeholder forum on 
CHP organized by the MN-DOC, commentators on the corresponding docket [185], and 
authors of/contributors to the documents from document analysis. An example of the 
recruitment email is given in section 7.5. Not only the authors and participants of the 
meetings but also people who run a CHP facility but don’t have public visibility were 
approached. List of such people were obtained by calling the facility using the CHP 
installation database [116]. Initially, only four of the 50 experts initially contacted agreed 
to be interviewed. This illustrates how the CHP community is closed to outsiders. 
Therefore, these four experts were used to recruit the remaining interviewees (“snowball 
sampling”) who were more willing to be interviewed after someone they knew and 
trusted introduced them to us. In this way, I was able to recruit 32 experts over a period 
of 1.5 years. Each of the experts I interviewed had at least 5 years of experience with 
CHP and was regarded as an expert by their peer interviewees (since they were generally 
cross-referenced among one another).  Table 3-1 contains the categorical breakdown of 
the experts. Though I was able to get a broad spectrum of expert interviewees, the 
recruitment process biases the sample of interviewees in several ways. First, the 
interviewees are mostly proponents of CHP because I selected experts who have worked 
on CHP projects. Second, most have experience with natural-gas-based CHP, but very 
few had experience with biomass-based CHP. Third, the experts are based in a few states 
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(Iowa, Minnesota, Massachusetts and Washington D.C.), though many them worked in 
other states and could speak about CHP in the United States more generally. 
7.8 Sample Interview Guide 
Introduction demographic questions 
• Establish that you have done homework, but you are a novice and are open to 
learn. Also be sure to establish that you will learn ins and outs but will not judge. 
• After this gives them the consent form, allow them to read and sign. Then start the 
recorder. 
Prelude: Our goal is to understand the diffusion/implementation process of energy 
technologies from implementer’s perspective. [Your organization] is an implementer (or 
potential implementer or rejecter)?  We have taken CHP as our case technology. We have 
been reading literature and e-dockets. But, to understand the process, we need to 
understand perspectives of actual participants. We need to learn from their experiences. 
That is why we are here. We would love to make this interview conversational. We want 
to learn about diffusion and implementation of CHP from your experience. 
Introduction 
1. How long have you been involved in [organization name]? 
2. How long have you participated directly in  
2.1. [This program] conceptualization or 
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2.2. [This program] implementation and promotion 
 
Understanding the market diffusion of CHP (the non-financial barriers) 
(1) Step 1: Understanding the policy problem. The key policy problem to be 
addressed. 
• Perception of the Problem:  
i. How severe of a problem was/is [this program in this place]? 
Why?  
• Viable Solutions:  
i. What were/are existing strategies (other than this program) to 
address this problem?  
ii. Why did you make this choice?  
• Desired Outcomes: 
i. What would be considered a “successful” outcome of [this 
program]?   
Probe: What would need to happen for this program to be 
considered a success? 
(2) Step 2: Understanding the existing system. Each place has a unique 
network/system that includes [various institutional actors]. 
• Structure:     
i. Can you describe the structure of [institutions] working to provide 
this [program]?  
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ii. What are the implications of this structure 
Probe: What would be different if this structure would be different?  
• Power & Authority: 
i. Can you describe who has the authority to make different decisions 
about [this program]?  
Probe: Does the staff set have discretion for how they will 
implement the program? Do they have the authority to change the 
structure operational steps?  
ii. What role do politics and elected (or appointed) officials play in 
determining [the problem/solution]? 
iii. How is ____ [this program] funded?  
iv. How would [other agencies involved in service] fund it? How 
much discretion do they have over deciding [this program]? 
• Culture:  
i. How things ‘really happen’ is often a function of culture.  Yet, it is 
often difficult to describe.  How would you metaphorically 
describe your [organization network], for example – factory, 
family, team, and zoo)?  Why?  
Probe: What are some of the key values that under-pin the way 
[this program] is delivered?  What are the values now? 
ii. To what extent do the [various actors your local system] 
investigate other models of best practices? Which models?  
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(3) Step 3: Implementing [the Policy/Program] in the System. 
• The integration challenges. 
i. Introducing [new program] into an existing local system takes 
political will, local leadership, designated capacity, etc. Describe 
the process by which the [this program] was first introduced? Were 
there any resistance or support? Who were the biggest supporters? 
Critics?   
ii. How difficulty (or easy) was it to integrate the [this program] into 
the existing system? What factors made it easier (or more 
difficult)? What were the biggest challenges?   
iii. How long did it take? 
iv. What sorts of communication media were used to make effective 
communications? 
• The design challenges.  
i. Describe/review the program process flow and key design 
elements (e.g., incentives, payment plans) [for this program]. 
ii. Which steps in the process was most challenging, and how did you 
overcome these challenges? 
Probe: [could list ones you know] 
iii. What factors influenced the program elements selected in this 
place (e.g., incentives, repayment plan structures, want to become 
greener)? Are these elements the “ideal” elements that should be 
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included in a model? Which elements are most important? What is 
missing, and why? 
iv. How long did it take? 
v. What sorts of communication media were used to make effective 
communications? 
(4) Step 4: Post implementation evaluation  – only for ones who have 
implemented   
i. How do you ‘now’ describe [this program]? 
ii. How could you evaluate if your expectations were met? 
iii. Describe the existing infrastructure for data collection system 
[for evaluating this program]. How would you describe the 
flexibility and capacity of this process?   
Probe: Were there any challenges in creating treatment and control? 
What were those? What made the solution easier/difficult? 
iv. How would you characterize risk and uncertainty at this phase? 
How about in the previous phases? 
v. How long do you think will this evaluation take? 
vi. What sorts of communication media are/were/should be used to 
make effective communications?  
Conclusion 
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i. How would you summarize innovation in each stage [in a word 
or two] (policy perception, actual system, implementation and 
post implementation)? 
ii. How would you summarize the most critical opportunities and 
barriers, for every stage, [in a word or two]? 
iii. If I am a supporter/adversary of this diffusion/implementation 
process  
a. How can I possibly block the process?  
b. How can I provide levers to unblock it? 
c. Where can I provide these levers? 
d. Who should I interact with? 
e. Can you provide some examples 
Extras 
i. What most important thing about energy innovation 
diffusion/implementation that we should know? 
ii. That is all for my questions. What else, do you think, that I 
should ask to know about this process? 
iii. Is there anything that you would want from me? 
iv. Who else should I speak with? 
